Hardaway v. District of Columbia Housing Authority
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22344
| D.C. Cir. | 2016Background
- Angelene Hardaway received HUD housing-voucher portability from Montgomery County and was approved there for a live-in aide (her sister Lena), qualifying her for a two-bedroom voucher.
- After moving to D.C., the D.C. Housing Authority (DCHA) issued a two-bedroom voucher but sent a July 9 letter denying Angelene’s request to approve a live-in aide, effectively rescinding the entitlement that justified a two-bedroom unit.
- Two days after the July 9 letter the Hardaways filed pro se suit alleging violations of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and Fair Housing Act and moved to seal medical records; DCHA later sent (Sept. 26) a letter reaffirming the live-in-aide denial but stating it would not revoke the two-bedroom voucher.
- The district court dismissed (and alternatively granted summary judgment) for lack of Article III standing and mootness, and denied the motion to seal; the D.C. Circuit reversed those rulings.
- The D.C. Circuit held Angelene had standing at filing because the July 9 rescission constituted an injury-in-fact (loss of a statutory entitlement and risk of eviction), the claims were not moot because DCHA’s continued allowance of the two-bedroom voucher was merely administrative grace and could be withdrawn, and the district court abused its discretion by failing to apply Hubbard factors to sealing.
- The court ordered sealing of the single medical form in the record and that descriptions of Angelene’s disability be redacted in filings; remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing | July 9 rescission of live-in aide approval deprived Angelene of a statutory entitlement (two-bedroom voucher) and care, causing concrete injury | No cognizable injury alleged; letters did not deny program participation based on disability | Angelene had standing at time of filing: government action targeted her and deprived a benefit, satisfying injury, causation, redressability |
| Mootness / voluntary cessation | DCHA’s September letter did not eliminate live controversy because denial of live-in aide remained and two-bedroom voucher was administratively tenuous | September letter mooted claims by acquiescing to desired living arrangement (keeping two-bedroom voucher) | Not moot: retention of voucher was an act of grace that could be revoked; DCHA failed heavy burden to show wrongful conduct could not recur |
| Sealing medical records (privacy) | Medical records and descriptions of disability are private and their disclosure would harm plaintiff; DCHA does not oppose sealing | Public right of access to judicial records; district court found disability must be pleaded and not so sensitive to seal | District court abused discretion by not applying Hubbard factors; D.C. Circuit ordered sealing of existing medical form and redaction of disability descriptions; remanded for further consideration |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (standing requires concrete and particularized injury)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing elements: injury, causation, redressability)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), 528 U.S. 167 (standing measured at filing; mootness and voluntary cessation standard)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (challenges to rescission of government benefits may be judicially reviewable)
- Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (due-process protections in termination of government benefits)
- United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199 (voluntary cessation mootness standard quoted in Laidlaw)
- United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (six-factor test for sealing judicial records)
- Kifafi v. Hilton Hotels Retirement Plan, 701 F.3d 718 (promise not to resume challenged conduct insufficient to show mootness)