665 F. App'x 390
6th Cir.2016Background
- Abrar Haque, owner of an accounting firm, was convicted at trial on 61 counts including substantive money‑laundering (three counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B)) arising from check‑for‑cash exchanges with an FBI cooperating witness.
- The cooperatively supplied cash was alleged by the witness to be proceeds of interstate transportation of stolen property, but the transactions were part of an FBI sting; no actual predicate crime occurred in fact.
- Haque’s substantive money‑laundering counts were sting‑based: they punished transactions represented to be criminal proceeds, not actual proceeds.
- Haque filed prior collateral challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 raising Santos/Kratt arguments; those were denied and a COA was refused. He then filed a § 2241 habeas petition claiming actual innocence based on United States v. Crosgrove.
- The district court denied relief, concluding § 2255 was the proper vehicle and the § 2255(e) savings clause did not apply; Haque appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Haque's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Haque may invoke § 2255(e) savings clause to bring a § 2241 petition alleging actual innocence of money‑laundering convictions | Crosgrove (applying the Santos/Kratt merger framework) shows he is actually innocent of § 1956 convictions because the definition of “proceeds” and merger analysis should invalidate his convictions | § 2255 is the proper remedy; savings clause unavailable because Haque previously used Santos/Kratt in § 2255 and his conviction is a sting case not implicated by Santos/Kratt merger concerns | Savings clause not available; § 2241 petition denied |
| Whether Crosgrove applies to Haque’s sting § 1956(a)(3)(B) convictions (i.e., whether Santos–Kratt merger problem exists) | Crosgrove’s merger analysis should apply and render the money‑laundering convictions invalid | Cruzgrove does not apply because those cases addressed promotional/proceeds laundering where the defendant participated in the underlying predicate offense; Haque’s case involved no actual predicate offense (FBI sting) so no merger problem | Crosgrove does not apply; no Santos–Kratt merger problem in sting cases |
| Whether Crosgrove announced a new interpretation of statutory law sufficient to show actual innocence for § 2255(e) purposes | Crosgrove changed the Santos/Kratt test (rejecting categorical approach) and thus is a new, retroactive statutory interpretation entitling Haque to relief | Crosgrove merely applied existing Santos/Kratt framework and did not announce a new rule of statutory interpretation | Crosgrove is not a new interpretation; Haque cannot satisfy the new‑law prong for actual innocence |
| Even if Crosgrove applied, whether Haque proved actual innocence (more likely than not no reasonable juror would convict) | He would not have been convicted under Crosgrove’s merger analysis | Because no merger problem exists and Crosgrove is not new law, Haque cannot meet the actual‑innocence standard | Haque fails to show actual innocence; § 2241 relief denied |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (plurality addressing meaning of “proceeds” in money‑laundering and the merger problem)
- United States v. Kratt, 579 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2009) (applies Santos merger framework to § 1957 and interprets “proceeds” as profits in limited circumstances)
- United States v. Crosgrove, 637 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2011) (applies Santos/Kratt to vacate a promotional money‑laundering conviction where predicate offense and laundering merged)
- Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303 (6th Cir. 2012) (explains § 2255(e) savings‑clause actual‑innocence standard and limits on § 2241 use)
- United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458 (6th Cir. 2001) (distinguishes § 2255 as primary remedy from § 2241 and calls for narrow savings‑clause application)
- United States v. Lineberry, 702 F.3d 210 (5th Cir. 2012) (holds no Santos merger problem where defendant was not charged with underlying predicate offense)