Happy Jack Ranch, Inc. and Frederick J. Behrend v. HH&L Development, Inc. Matthew Stolhandske, Trustee Michael Strnad
03-12-00558-CV
| Tex. App. | Apr 7, 2015Background
- This filing is Appellee Michael Strnad’s motion for rehearing after the Third Court of Appeals reversed the trial-court award of attorneys’ fees to Strnad. The appeals court concluded it was error to award fees under the UDJA for what it characterized as essentially a trespass-to-try-title claim.
- Procedural history: multiple suits between Behrend (and Happy Jack Ranch/HH&L Development) and Strnad concerning four tracts of land; a 2003 default judgment against Strnad and subsequent litigation culminated in the trial court awarding Strnad attorneys’ fees.
- Behrend’s live pleadings in the case invoked the Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) and sought cancellation/quieting of deeds; Strnad was joined as a party but was not in possession of the property.
- The appeals court relied on Coinmach to conclude the trespass-to-try-title statute was the plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy for claims affecting title/possession and therefore reversed the UDJA-based fee award.
- Strnad argues (1) the trial court’s fee ruling was not preserved as the trespass-to-try-title objection was never raised below, (2) an award can be supported by Property Code provisions applicable to undisclosed-beneficiary/trust issues, (3) his general fee pleadings allow recovery under any applicable statute, and (4) a defendant forced to defend an improperly-invoked UDJA claim may recover UDJA fees even if the UDJA invocation was erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Behrend) | Defendant's Argument (Strnad) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether attorneys’ fees awarded under the UDJA were proper for claims that the court treated as trespass-to-try-title | Behrend proceeded under the UDJA and joined Strnad as a nominal party whose rights might be affected; UDJA invocation justified fee requests | Even if the claim invoked the UDJA, Strnad (not in possession) could recover fees for defending an improperly framed UDJA action; alternatively fees are supportable under Property Code provisions for undisclosed beneficiaries | Court of Appeals reversed the UDJA-based fee award (concluding trespass-to-try-title statute was the exclusive remedy for the title/possession dispute) |
| Whether the trespass-to-try-title objection was waived for appellate review | Not addressed below as a preserved complaint; Behrend contends UDJA joinder was required | Objection was not preserved below; raising it for the first time on appeal is waived | Court of Appeals applied Coinmach and reversed; Strnad argues waiver so rehearing should reinstate fees |
| Whether a general prayer for attorneys’ fees suffices to support fees under any applicable statute when no findings were made | Behrend relied on UDJA and requested fees in pleadings | A general fee plea permits the trial court (and appellate court) to affirm the award under any statutory basis supported by the evidence (e.g., Property Code trust/undisclosed-beneficiary provisions) | Appeals court reversed UDJA fee award; Strnad argues trial court discretion and lack of findings mean the award can be upheld on other theories |
| Whether claims for cancellation of a deed (equitable relief) are governed by trespass-to-try-title statute | Behrend treated the suit as affecting title and possession and framed relief to quiet title/cancel deeds | Cancellation of a deed procured by fraud is equitable and not necessarily subsumed by trespass-to-try-title; Property Code and case law treat some equitable claims as distinct | Court of Appeals concluded the UDJA fee award was improper under Coinmach; Strnad asserts Wilhoite/Florey support treating deed-cancellation claims as outside trespass-to-try-title umbrella |
Key Cases Cited
- Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2013) (UDJA fee awards improper where trespass-to-try-title statute provides the exclusive remedy for claims seeking determination of possessory/title rights)
- Mansions in the Forest, L.P. v. Montgomery County, 365 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. 2012) (preservation of error requirement and prudential reasons for raising complaints in trial court)
- Wilhoite v. Sims, 401 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013) (suit to cancel deed obtained by fraud is equitable and not governed by trespass-to-try-title statute)
- Krabbe v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 46 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001) (failure to preserve argument that declaratory-relief claim was essentially trespass-to-try-title waives complaint on appeal)
- Florey v. Estate of McConnell, 212 S.W.3d 439 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006) (UDJA may be available to resolve validity of written instruments where claim is not a straightforward possessory/title dispute)