316 F.R.D. 179
E.D. La.2016Background
- Underlying: Two state-court personal-injury suits allege Allied Shipyard’s sandblasting released hazardous silica dust; plaintiffs claim personal and property damages.
- Allied impleaded its contractors (including Masse and Superior) in the state suits and sought indemnity and additional-insured coverage from contractor insurers.
- Several insurers (Hanover, Arch, State National) filed related federal declaratory-judgment actions about their duties to defend/indemnify in the state suits; the federal cases were consolidated.
- Masse filed third-party claims in the federal action against many of its past insurers, including Gray Insurance Company, seeking declarations that Gray must defend/indemnify Masse in the state suits.
- Gray moved to strike/dismiss Masse’s third-party claim under Rule 14, arguing Masse’s claim is not derivative of the main (Arch v. Masse) claim and thus improper impleader; the Court treated Gray’s motion as one to strike under Rule 14(a)(4).
- The Court struck Masse’s third-party claim against Gray and dismissed it without prejudice, finding Gray’s liability is not dependent on the outcome of Arch’s declaratory claim against Masse and therefore impleader under Rule 14 is improper.
Issues
| Issue | Masse's Argument | Gray's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Masse may implead Gray under Rule 14 | Gray may be liable to Masse for Allied’s potential indemnity claims if Arch succeeds, so Gray is potentially liable for part of Arch’s claim | Gray’s potential liability is independent of Arch’s claim; Arch’s success would not create liability Masse could pass to Gray | Denied — impleader improper: third-party liability must be derivative of the main claim and here it is not |
| Whether the declaratory-judgment context creates an exception to Rule 14 | Masse: courts sometimes allow impleader in declaratory actions; exception should permit Gray’s impleader | No separate declaratory-judgment exception to Rule 14; cited cases are distinguishable | Denied — no general declaratory-judgment exception; claims require independent analysis of separate policies |
| Whether the court has supplemental jurisdiction over Masse’s claim against Gray | Masse implied supplemental jurisdiction because claims arise from same underlying facts | Gray noted both are Louisiana citizens and the claims are not part of same case/controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) | Denied — court lacks supplemental jurisdiction because claims are not sufficiently related |
| Whether permissive factors (prejudice, delay, substance, efficiency) justify impleader despite Rule 14 limits | Masse argued courts consider such factors and they favor allowing impleader | Gray argued Rule 14’s derivative-liability requirement is dispositive and these factors cannot overcome it | Not reached — court declined to exercise discretion because the claim is procedurally outside Rule 14’s scope |
Key Cases Cited
- Joe Grasso & Son, Inc. v. United States, 380 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1967) (Rule 14 requires third-party liability to be derivative of main claim; impleader improper when liabilities are separate)
- American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 232 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1956) (permitting impleader where issues are so closely intertwined that consistent results require joint resolution)
- Southeastern Mortgage Co. v. Mullins, 514 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1975) (impleader only when third-party liability depends on outcome of main claim)
- Majors v. American National Bank of Huntsville, 426 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1970) (discussing limits on impleader and derivative-liability requirement)