Hannon v. Beard
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11549
| 1st Cir. | 2011Background
- Hannon, convicted of murder in 1978, has been incarcerated continuously and acts as a jailhouse lawyer and inmate advocate.
- PDOC historically housed Hannon in Pennsylvania, creating multiple separation concerns and transfers to other states under ICC over the years.
- From 1997 onward, PDOC used separations to justify out-of-state placements, including Maryland, District of Columbia, and eventually Massachusetts in 2001.
- In May 2001, after a temporary repatriation, PDOC transferred Hannon again—this time to a Massachusetts maximum-security facility at Massachusetts’ request.
- Hannon sued Beard (PDOC Secretary) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the Massachusetts transfer was retaliatory for his First Amendment activity.
- District court granted summary judgment for Beard; the First Circuit affirmed, finding no prima facie retaliation evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prima facie retaliation established? | Hannon asserts protected activity caused the transfer. | No causal link; transfer justified by separations and ICC considerations. | No genuine causal link; no retaliation prima facie. |
| Evidence sufficiency for retaliation at summary judgment? | Direct and circumstantial evidence show motive. | Hearsay evidence and conclusory claims are inadmissible or insufficient. | Hearsay statements disregarded; not enough to infer retaliation. |
| Temporal proximity proves retaliation? | Proximate timing supports retaliation inference. | Transfer decision predates Beard's tenure; timing unrelated to retaliation. | Timing alone does not establish retaliation; chronology weak. |
| Letter’s language (e.g., 'nuisance') proves retaliatory motive? | Descriptive terms reflect retaliation for First Amendment activity. | Letter reflects separations and management concerns, not First Amendment activity. | No competent evidence linking 'nuisance' label to First Amendment activity. |
Key Cases Cited
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (U.S. 1987) (courts defer to prison officials' managerial decisions)
- Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2009) (retaliation claims require factual support not mere speculation)
- Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2000) (retaliation claims require concrete evidence of motive)
- Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc; heightened standard for proving retaliation)
- Bennett v. Goord, 343 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2003) (circumstantial evidence may support retaliation claims)
- Gayle v. Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677 (2d Cir. 2002) (temporal proximity as circumstantial evidence of retaliation)
- O'Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2011) (personal knowledge requirement for admissible evidence)
- Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2005) (retaliation claims require evidence beyond mere speculation)
- Dávila v. Corporación de P.R. Para La Difusión Pública, 498 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2007) (reliance on admissible evidence and personal knowledge)