Hanna v. State
2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 542
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2014Background
- Appellant pled guilty to driving while intoxicated (DWI) after crashing into a utility pole; trial court ordered $7,767.88 restitution to Lubbock Power & Light (LP&L) for pole repairs.
- At restitution hearing the State introduced a repair invoice; after initial insufficiency claim, officer testified he arrived at a crash scene with a broken pole and that appellant was driving; officer did not testify appellant showed signs of intoxication.
- Appellant objected that Article 42.0371 (restitution statute) does not authorize restitution because DWI is a "victimless" offense and LP&L was not named in the charging instrument.
- The court of appeals reversed the restitution order, holding (1) DWI is a victimless crime that does not per se encompass a victim, and (2) no victim was alleged in the charging instrument.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review, held that (a) restitution may be ordered in DWI cases and to victims not named in the charging instrument, but (b) the State must prove by a preponderance that the offense was the direct (but-for and proximate) cause of the loss.
- Applying that standard, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ deletion of the restitution award because the State failed to prove appellant’s intoxication caused the pole damage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether restitution is available for "victimless" crimes (e.g., DWI) | State: Article 42.037 allows restitution to "any victim of the offense," so victims of DWI accidents may receive restitution | Hanna: DWI has no required victim; restitution improper because offense need not involve injury or property loss | Restitution may be ordered for DWI when the State proves the loss was directly caused by the offense (but-for and proximate causation) |
| Whether a restitution recipient must be named in the charging instrument | State: "any victim" language permits restitution to victims not named in indictment | Hanna: Restitution limited to named complainant/victim; holding otherwise expands restitution improperly | A victim need not be named in the charging instrument; restitution may be ordered to any person proven to have suffered loss as a direct result of the offense |
| What causation standard applies for restitution | State: preponderance that defendant’s offense directly caused the loss suffices | Hanna: insufficient evidence of causation here; invoice alone inadequate | The State must prove by a preponderance that the defendant’s commission of the offense was the but-for and proximate cause of the victim’s loss |
| Whether the evidence here supported restitution to LP&L | State: officer testimony and invoice show appellant’s vehicle hit the pole causing damage | Hanna: officer did not testify appellant was intoxicated or that intoxication caused the crash; appellant offered alternative cause (hit puddle); insufficient proof | Restitution order reversed: State failed to prove intoxicated driving caused the pole damage by preponderance of evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Gordon v. State, 707 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (restitution deleted where record lacked factual basis linking defendant to victim’s loss)
- Martin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (restitution limited to losses caused by offenses for which defendant is criminally responsible)
- Cabla v. State, 6 S.W.3d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (restitution limited to losses proven to be caused by the crime adjudicated)
- Campbell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (trial court may order restitution only to victims of the offense charged)
- Bruni v. State, 669 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.—Austin 1984) (restitution to non-named spouse permitted where record showed spouse personally suffered loss)
- Lemos v. State, 27 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000) (discussion limiting restitution to direct victims of charged offense)
- Kuciemba v. State, 310 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (being intoxicated at accident scene is circumstantial evidence relevant to causation)
- Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (U.S. 1990) (federal restitution compensates persons directly and proximately harmed by the conduct underlying the conviction)