Hand v. State, 459 P.3d 1014

Ronald Hand was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor in 2013 and, pro se, filed habeas-style petitions using a federal §2254 form: a federal petition in May 2017 and a substantially similar petition in Second District Court in June 2017 (he crossed out “United States” and wrote “Second”).
The state court asked Hand to pay the filing fee; Hand requested withdrawal of the state petition, and the court dismissed it under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A) (voluntary dismissal).
The federal district court continued with Hand’s federal petition, appointed counsel, and with counsel Hand filed an amended federal petition and a new state post-conviction petition.
The State moved for summary judgment in state court, arguing Utah Code §78B-9-106(1)(d) bars Hand’s new petition because his earlier (withdrawn) petition constituted a “previous request for post-conviction relief.” The district court granted the State’s motion.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding a voluntary dismissal under rule 41(a)(1)(A) renders the proceedings a nullity and therefore does not count as a “previous request for post-conviction relief.”
The Court also rejected the State’s arguments that Hand’s rule 41 reliance was unpreserved and that the PCRA’s broad language overrides the rule 41 effect.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a petition voluntarily dismissed under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A) is a "previous request for post-conviction relief" under Utah Code §78B-9-106(1)(d)	Hand: Voluntary dismissal makes the earlier filing a nullity and not a previous request	State: The PCRA bars any prior request; the statute’s broad “any previous request” encompasses the dismissed filing	The Court held a 41(a)(1)(A) voluntary dismissal leaves no “previous request”; therefore the PCRA bar does not apply on that basis
Whether Hand’s reliance on rule 41(a)(1)(A) was unpreserved	Hand: He preserved the underlying issue and may cite additional authority in support	State: Hand failed to preserve the rule 41 argument	The Court found the argument preserved—parties may present new authority on a preserved issue
Whether Utah Code §78B-9-106(1)(d) alters the legal effect of a rule 41(a)(1)(A) voluntary dismissal	Hand: The statute is silent on voluntary-dismissal effect; rule 41 and controlling case law govern	State: The statute’s broad language should limit the rule 41 effect and make the prior filing preclusive	The Court held the statute does not modify the settled effect of rule 41(a)(1)(A); statutory silence means rule 41 controls

Barton v. Utah Transit Auth., 872 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1994) (voluntary dismissal under rule 41(a)(1)(A) renders proceedings a nullity)
State v. Johnson, 416 P.3d 443 (Utah 2017) (distinguishing new issues from new arguments for preservation)
Patterson v. Patterson, 266 P.3d 828 (Utah 2011) (permitting consideration of new controlling authority on preserved issues)
Graves v. N. E. Servs., Inc., 345 P.3d 619 (Utah 2015) (interpretation that the term “any” is broad and inclusive)
Winward v. State, 293 P.3d 259 (Utah 2012) (discussing limits and threshold considerations for post-conviction review)