Hand v. Scott
285 F. Supp. 3d 1289
N.D. Fla.2018Background
- Plaintiffs sued to challenge Florida’s clemency-based vote-restoration scheme, alleging it grants officials unfettered discretion that threatens viewpoint discrimination and arbitrary delays in restoring voting rights to former felons.
- The scheme vests final authority with the Governor and Clemency Board, with rules explicitly allowing denial “at any time, for any reason.”
- Plaintiffs presented examples suggesting political, racial, and viewpoint-based disparities in who receives restoration and examples of indefinite or highly varied reapplication timelines.
- Court evaluated four claims: (Count One) First Amendment challenge to unfettered discretion; (Count Two) Equal Protection challenge to arbitrary/disparate treatment; (Count Three) First Amendment challenge to lack of time limits; (Count Four) challenge to statutory 5- and 7-year waiting periods.
- The Court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs on Counts One, Two, and Three, finding the clemency process constitutionally defective; it denied relief on Count Four, upholding the uniform waiting periods as reasonable.
- The Court declined to strike Florida’s disenfranchisement statutes (the underlying felony exclusion) but found the restoration process unconstitutional and ordered supplemental briefing on remedies.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Amendment — unfettered discretion / viewpoint discrimination (Count One) | The Governor/Board’s unfettered discretion permits viewpoint-based and arbitrary denials of re-enfranchisement, chilling associational and expressive rights. | Clemency is individualized executive discretion and not a constitutionally suspect process immune from politics. | Granted for Plaintiffs — Board’s unfettered discretion risks unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination; process fails strict scrutiny. |
| Fourteenth Amendment — equal protection (Count Two) | The discretionary scheme allows arbitrary and disparate treatment, valuing some former felons’ votes over others. | Clemency is an executive power; states retain broad discretion in reenfranchisement and Shepherd supports reasonableness. | Granted for Plaintiffs — scheme permits arbitrary/discriminatory distinctions and violates Equal Protection. |
| First Amendment — lack of time limits (Count Three) | Absence of defined decision timelines enables indefinite delay, suppressing speech/association and facilitating discriminatory outcomes. | Some delay is reasonable to assess rehabilitation; no fixed deadline is necessary to determine “responsible voters.” | Granted for Plaintiffs — indefinite timelines create a substantial risk of suppression and viewpoint discrimination; unconstitutional. |
| Waiting periods for application (5- and 7-year) (Count Four) | Plaintiffs contend these delays burden rights and should be invalidated. | State argues waiting periods are reasonable, uniform, and advance interest in responsible electorate. | Denied for Plaintiffs / Granted for Defendants — uniform waiting periods are reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions and constitutional. |
Key Cases Cited
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (viewpoint-based governmental regulation of speech is especially suspect)
- Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (government discrimination among viewpoints is a blatant form of content discrimination)
- Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (restrictions based on speaker identity often function to control content)
- Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (government action that stifles speech on account of its message poses risk of suppressing unpopular ideas)
- Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (facial delegation of broad discretion to decisionmakers supports a facial challenge when nothing prevents content- or viewpoint-based decisions)
- Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915) (executive clemency power must be exercised consistent with constitutional protections)
- Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974) (conditions on clemency must not violate the Constitution)
- Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (the State may not, by arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over another’s)
- Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (Constitution permits states to disenfranchise felons but reenfranchisement processes remain subject to other constitutional limits)
- Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1978) (re-enfranchisement must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest and cannot be completely arbitrary)