Hancox v. Allbaugh, 707 F. App'x 528

Aaron Hancox, an Oklahoma state prisoner, sought a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas application as time-barred under AEDPA.
Hancox pled guilty and was sentenced July 6, 2011; because he filed no motion to withdraw or direct appeal, his conviction became final ten days later on July 16, 2011.
AEDPA’s one-year limitations period began the next day and expired July 17, 2012; the district court added 84 days of statutory tolling for a sentence-modification motion filed April 12, 2012 and denied July 5, 2012, making an October 9, 2012 deadline.
Hancox filed his federal § 2254 petition on June 28, 2016—well after the limitations period—and did not assert statutory or equitable tolling as a basis for timeliness.
Hancox argued his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claim is exempt from AEDPA’s time bar (relying on Lafler-related reasoning) and alternatively suggested the limitations period should start later based on when he discovered facts showing prejudice (including alleged post-hearing counsel silence and later correspondence in Feb. 2014).
The court construed pro se filings liberally, considered whether § 2244(d)(1)(D) (discovery of factual predicate) could delay accrual, but concluded that even under the most favorable timeline and tolling assumptions Hancox’s petition was untimely.

Issue	Hancox's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether an IAC claim is categorically exempt from AEDPA’s one-year limitation	IAC like Lafler is not subject to AEDPA time bars; his claim is effectively identical to Lafler	IAC claims are not exempt from AEDPA; timeliness is governed by § 2244(d)	Denied: IAC claims are not categorically exempt from AEDPA limitations
Proper accrual date for AEDPA limitations for Hancox’s IAC claim	Limitations should begin when he discovered prejudice (claimed Feb 2014 when counsel replied)	Limitations began when judgment became final (July 2011); any later accrual still leaves petition untimely	Denied: Even assuming later accrual and tolling, petition was filed after deadline
Whether statutory tolling applied to extend filing deadline	Argued motion practice and correspondence tolled or delayed accrual	District court allowed 84 days tolling for state motion and considered additional tolling window but found insufficient	Denied relief: tolling did not make petition timely
Whether federal habeas can challenge state postconviction procedure errors	Argued errors in state postconviction process/supporting counsel conduct warrant habeas review	State argued such claims are generally not cognizable on federal habeas	Agreed with state: due-process claims about state postconviction procedures generally not cognizable on federal habeas

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (standard for COA when dismissal is on procedural grounds)
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (IAC in plea-bargain context where deficient advice led to rejection of plea and harsher sentence)
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013) (actual innocence gateway and AEDPA timeliness context)
Clayton v. Jones, 700 F.3d 435 (10th Cir. 2012) (finality of convictions after guilty plea under Oklahoma rules)
United States v. Vanderwerff, 788 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2015) (discussion of Lafler and ineffective-assistance principles)
Davis v. McCollum, 798 F.3d 1317 (10th Cir. 2015) (IAC claims and AEDPA timeliness)
Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (accrual for IAC requires discovery of facts showing both deficient performance and prejudice)
Washington v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 1283 (10th Cir. 2017) (Strickland elements and IAC framework)
Dago v. United States, 441 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (postconviction-procedure due-process claims not cognizable in federal habeas)