Hampton v. Utah Department of Corrections
87 F.4th 1183
10th Cir.2023Background
- Hampton, born missing two fingers on each hand, was hired as a Utah Corrections Officer and qualified on UDC firearms training (including the Glock) but said Glocks were difficult to grip and requested an accommodation to carry a Springfield 1911.
- UDC’s Firearms Policy authorizes only department-issued handguns (Glock models) for Corrections Officers; Hampton requested a non‑approved Springfield 1911; his request was denied orally/ignored and no written denial was provided.
- Hampton later was placed in a mostly unarmed permanent post (Timp Rover), and shortly thereafter UDC terminated him following internal investigations into workplace incidents UDC characterized as misconduct.
- Hampton sued under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, alleging failure to accommodate, disparate treatment (disability discrimination), and retaliation for requesting an accommodation; the district court granted summary judgment for UDC on all claims.
- The Tenth Circuit reversed summary judgment on the failure‑to‑accommodate claim (holding Hampton’s requested equipment modification was plausibly reasonable and raised a triable issue), affirmed on disparate‑treatment and retaliation (no sufficient evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory causation), and remanded for further proceedings on accommodation/undue‑hardship and interactive‑process issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to accommodate: Was Hampton’s request for a Springfield 1911 a plausibly reasonable accommodation, or did it eliminate an essential job function by violating the Glock‑only policy? | Hampton: his request was an equipment acquisition/modification to enable him to perform essential functions safely; the Glock‑only rule alone cannot make the request facially unreasonable. | UDC: qualifying on and using only department‑issued Glocks is an essential function tied to safety, training, maintenance, and uniformity; permitting a different handgun would violate the Firearms Policy. | Reversed: the Glock‑only policy cannot automatically render the accommodation facially unreasonable; a genuine dispute exists whether Glock use is an essential function and whether denial posed undue hardship. |
| Disparate treatment (intentional discrimination): Did UDC terminate or reassign Hampton because of his disability? | Hampton: UDC had an unspoken policy against accommodations during probation and evidence (statements, notices) supports an inference of discrimination. | UDC: decisionmaker (Warden Benzon) hired Hampton knowing his disability and there is no affirmative evidence Benzon terminated him because of disability. | Affirmed: insufficient evidence that disability was a determining factor in termination or reassignment; no triable issue on discriminatory animus. |
| Retaliation: Was there a causal connection between Hampton’s accommodation request and his termination? | Hampton: timing and UDC’s informal practices of routing accommodation requests could allow an inference Warden knew and retaliated. | UDC: Warden Benzon testified he did not know of the request before firing; no record evidence shows anyone informed him pre‑decision. | Affirmed: plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute that the decisionmaker had knowledge of the protected request and acted because of it. |
| Exclusion of plaintiff’s expert testimony: Did the district court abuse discretion in excluding Hampton’s expert testimony about his disability’s effects on weapon use? | Hampton: his experience and knowledge qualified him to testify as his own expert on how his disability affects weapon handling. | UDC: Hampton failed to satisfy Daubert/Rule 702 reliability (no methodology, testing, peer review, error rates). | Affirmed: district court applied proper gatekeeping, and exclusion was not an abuse of discretion because Hampton failed to show reliable methods or bases for expert opinion. |
Key Cases Cited
- US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (neutral employment rules do not automatically render reasonable accommodations unreasonable)
- Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2004) (accommodation unreasonable if it eliminates an essential job function)
- Dansie v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 42 F.4th 1184 (10th Cir. 2022) (reasonable accommodation defined as enabling performance of essential functions)
- Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2018) (failure to accommodate is treated as based on disability)
- Aubrey v. Koppes, 975 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2020) (definition and scope of reasonable accommodations)
- Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff must present affirmative evidence that protected trait was a determining factor)
- Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330 (10th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s burden to suggest a plausible accommodation)
- Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2014) (employer may avoid liability by proving undue hardship)
- Adair v. City of Muskogee, 823 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2016) (courts give weight to employer’s judgment about essential job functions)