Hampton v. State of Utah Department of Corrections, 1:18-cv-00079

Background

Plaintiff Robert Hampton, born with three fingers on each hand, worked for the Utah Department of Corrections (UDOC) as a corrections officer from May 2016 to July 26, 2017.
UDOC requires qualification on Department-issued firearms (Glock models) under a written Firearms Policy that does not authorize exceptions to primary duty weapons.
Hampton completed UDOC firearms training and qualified on the Glock (2016 and requalified 2017), but requested a reasonable accommodation (use of a Springfield 1911 instead of a Glock) by email in February 2017.
UDOC personnel forwarded the request for decision; the Armorer orally declined the Springfield but Hampton received no written denial or full resolution; Hampton later was reassigned from a nonpermanent Utility post to a permanent (unarmed) Rover position and subsequently terminated after administrative findings related to a VKS weapon incident and a separate incident involving a dead bird.
Hampton sued under the Rehabilitation Act alleging failure to accommodate, retaliation, and disability discrimination; the court granted UDOC summary judgment and dismissed all claims with prejudice, finding (inter alia) the Springfield request was facially unreasonable because it conflicted with the Firearms Policy and Hampton failed to show causation for retaliation/discrimination claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Failure to accommodate (Rehabilitation Act)	Hampton requested a plausible accommodation (use of a Springfield) because Glock grip issues required him to alter grip and use a personal holster to qualify.	UDOC contends Hampton was "otherwise qualified" because he qualified on Department-issued firearms and the requested Springfield violated the Firearms Policy.	Court: UDOC entitled to summary judgment. Hampton was otherwise qualified (he qualified on Glock) and the requested accommodation was facially unreasonable because it contravened a job-related, uniformly enforced Firearms Policy.
Retaliation — termination	Hampton alleges termination was retaliation for requesting the Springfield accommodation.	UDOC argues decisionmaker (Warden Benzon) was unaware of the accommodation request at termination.	Court: Summary judgment for UDOC. Hampton failed to show decisionmaker knew of protected activity; no causal connection.
Retaliation — reassignment to Rover	Hampton says reassignment to an unarmed Rover (from Utility) was retaliatory for accommodation request and harmed his promotion prospects.	UDOC: transfer was to a permanent position with no loss of pay/benefits and did not materially alter duties; not adverse.	Court: Summary judgment for UDOC. Reassignment was not an adverse employment action and Hampton produced no evidence of causation.
Disability discrimination (disparate treatment)	Hampton points to (1) alleged de facto denial/poor handling of accommodation, (2) denial of promotion to armed posts, and (3) perceived unequal discipline of others.	UDOC: termination was for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons based on administrative findings; mere awareness of disability is not proof of discriminatory motive.	Court: Summary judgment for UDOC. Hampton failed to present affirmative evidence that disability was a determining factor or show pretext.

Key Cases Cited

Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2004) (two‑part qualified‑individual analysis and deference to employer’s description of essential job functions)
Hennagir v. Utah Dept. of Corrections, 587 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2009) (plaintiff bears initial burden to show facially reasonable accommodation; employer may show inability to provide it)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination and retaliation claims)
Hwang v. Kansas State University, 753 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2014) (employer need not modify uniform policies when other reasonable accommodations exist unless policy is a sham)
Aubrey v. Koppes, 975 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2020) (summary judgment standard and Rehabilitation Act/ADA analysis)
Montes v. Vail Clinic, 497 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007) (retaliation requires that decisionmaker knew of protected activity)