Hampton v. State
2012 Ind. LEXIS 15
| Ind. | 2012Background
- Hampton was convicted of murder, rape, and criminal deviate conduct after D.L.’s death in 2000 in Terre Haute, Indiana.
- DNA evidence matched Hampton's DNA to semen in vaginal swabs and on the victim’s tank top.
- At post-conviction, Hampton claimed appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging trial court’s refusal to give a “reasonable theory of innocence” instruction.
- The post-conviction court denied relief, finding DNA evidence treated as direct evidence and that Indiana law was unclear on direct vs circumstantial classification.
- Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to clarify the need for a “reasonable theory of innocence” instruction when actus reus is proven exclusively by circumstantial evidence.
- The Court reformed the instruction and held it should be given only when the conduct constituting the actus reus is proved exclusively by circumstantial evidence, and affirmed denial of post-conviction relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the instruction denial | Hampton argues DNA is circumstantial, so the instruction was required | State contends DNA fell under direct evidence or that issue was strategically waived | No reversible error; appellate counsel not deficient given the DNA-circumstantial ambiguity and case law at the time |
| Whether DNA evidence is direct or circumstantial evidence for actus reus | DNA evidence should be treated as circumstantial evidence | DNA evidence can be direct evidence of identity or presence | DNA evidence considered circumstantial as to actus reus; direct evidence analysis applied to presence/identity, not actus reus |
| Whether the required jury instruction should be given when actus reus is proven exclusively circumstantially | A separate reasonable theory of innocence instruction is necessary | Reasonable doubt instruction suffices | Instruction warranted only when actus reus is proven exclusively by circumstantial evidence; otherwise not required |
| Whether the Court should reformulate and apply a new standard for the instruction | The existing pattern language is confusing and should be reformed | The court should maintain current standards | Yes; reformulated to instruct jurors to require conclusive proof excluding every reasonable theory of innocence when actus reus is purely circumstantial |
Key Cases Cited
- Nichols v. State, 591 N.E.2d 134 (Ind. 1992) (recognizes need for reasonable theory of innocence instruction)
- Gambill v. State, 675 N.E.2d 675 (Ind. 1996) (supports separate instruction for circumstantial evidence)
- Lloyd v. State, 669 N.E.2d 980 (Ind. 1996) (entitles defendant to instruction when circumstantial evidence exclusively proves actus reus)
- Spears v. State, 272 Ind. 634, 401 N.E.2d 331 (Ind. 1980) (discussed when to apply the reasonable theory of innocence instruction)
- Davenport v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1144 (Ind. 2001) (refusal to give circumstantial-evidence instruction proper when evidence is not exclusively circumstantial)
- Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (U.S. 1954) (circumstantial-evidence instruction deemed confusing when reasonable doubt instructed adequately)