Hampton v. State
289 Ga. 621
| Ga. | 2011Background
- Hampton was convicted of malice murder of Julian Smith, aggravated assault of Kyzer Green, hindering the apprehension of a criminal, and tampering with evidence; the crimes arose from a 2003 shooting at Bridge Creek Apartments.
- Evidence showed a gunman shot Smith at close range; Green survived; witnesses identified a shooter wearing a stocking and a getaway car with tinted windows.
- Testimony linked Hampton to planning and facilitating the murder, including hiding the shooter Blackshear, removing tint from the getaway car, and disposing of the murder weapon.
- Co-indictees Jones and Venisee testified to Hampton’s involvement and motive, including that Smith had killed Hampton’s friend; Hampton was implicated in directing participants.
- The jury found Hampton guilty on all counts; sentencing included life for malice murder and concurrent/consecutive terms for other offenses; Hampton appealed challenging multiple rulings and interpretations.
- The Court vacated the hindering conviction and remanded for misdemeanor sentencing on tampering; affirmed malice murder and aggravated assault; remanded for resentencing on other matters, with various rulings upheld or rejected on timing and procedure.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hindering vs. malice murder conviction | Hampton argues hindering is the same as being an accessory after the fact and cannot co-exist with malice murder | State contends hindering is a separate offense; but the court should set aside the hindering conviction, not the malice murder | Hindering conviction vacated; malice murder affirmed |
| Tampering with evidence sentencing scope | Conviction for tampering should reflect felony exposure due to co-defendant cases | Jury verdict ambiguous on whether tampering was in Hampton’s case (misdemeanor) or others (felony) | Felony tampering sentence vacated; remanded for misdemeanor sentencing |
| Trial judge recusal issue timeliness | There was an appearance of partiality due to the judge’s former law partner representing the victim’s estate | Recusal should be considered on the merits if timely raised | Recusal claim denied as untimely; motion properly denied |
| Cross-examination of co-indictee about bond | Defense should be allowed to probe potential bias from bond favorable to State | Cross-examination limited to within trial court discretion; bond amount marginally relevant | Trial court did not abuse discretion; bond amount deemed marginally relevant |
| Consideration of uncounseled prior pleas in aggravation | Uncounseled pleas can be used to aggravate; issue preserved/arguable | Objection not preserved; even if raised, record shows no reliance on uncounseled pleas | Issue not preserved; even if considered, no reversible error; authority to sentence affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (sufficiency of evidence standard; rational trier of fact; credibility resolved by jury)
- Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 673 S.E.2d 223 (Ga. 2009) (jury credibility determinations deferential to the jury)
- Stanton v. State, 274 Ga. 21, 549 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. 2001) (hindering/applicant-as-fact equivalence to accessory after the fact; splitting culpability persistently discouraged)
- State v. Freeman, 272 Ga. 813, 537 S.E.2d 92 (Ga. 2000) (no dual conviction for principal and accessory after the fact)
- Jordan v. State, 272 Ga. 395, 530 S.E.2d 192 (Ga. 2000) (same principle as Freeman regarding duplication of offenses)
- Thaxton v. State, 184 Ga.App. 779, 362 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. App. 1987) (illustrates discretionary limits on related verdicts)
- Lindsey v. State, 262 Ga. 665, 424 S.E.2d 616 (Ga. 1993) (recusal/timeliness considerations under Rule 25.1)
- Christensen v. State, 245 Ga.App. 165, 537 S.E.2d 446 (Ga. App. 2000) (timeliness and procedure in recusal challenges)