Hampton v. Social Security
2:16-cv-12135
E.D. Mich.Jul 24, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Mary Rosellamay Hampton applied for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits alleging disability from December 1, 2012, due to fibromyalgia, arthritis, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, tendon injuries, COPD/asthma, and depression. ALJ held a hearing on Oct. 8, 2014; decision denying benefits issued Dec. 22, 2014; Appeals Council denied review.
- Relevant medical record: long history of fibromyalgia and shoulder/wrist complaints; imaging showed only minimal-to-mild degenerative changes; EMG showed mild/minimal abnormalities; treating physician Dr. Ebuen‑Mercado (Aug. 2014) opined extreme limitations including inability to sit/stand/walk and severe manipulative limits.
- Consultative examiners found more moderate limits: Dr. Nims observed full grip strength and ability to perform fine manipulation; Dr. Marshall (psych) found ability to do simple repetitive tasks (GAF 60); non‑examining reviewers endorsed capacity for sedentary work with some restrictions.
- ALJ found severe impairments (including fibromyalgia) but ruled they did not meet listings, assessed an RFC for sedentary work with: sit/stand option (not off‑task >10%), no ladders, occasional overhead reach and foot controls, frequent (but not constant) bilateral handling/fingering, environmental limitations, and work limited to simple, routine, non‑fast‑paced tasks.
- Vocational expert testified those limitations preclude past work but allow substantial numbers of sedentary, unskilled jobs (information clerk, general office clerk, hand packer); need for 20% off‑task time, daily 3‑hour naps, or frequent absences would preclude work.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Weight given to treating physician opinion (Dr. Ebuen‑Mercado) | Dr. Ebuen‑Mercado’s August 2014 opinion shows extreme, disabling limitations and should be given controlling weight | ALJ properly discounted it as inconsistent with objective findings, other treating/consultative records, and plaintiff’s activities | ALJ gave "good reasons" for giving the opinion little weight; rejection supported by substantial evidence |
| RFC manipulative limitations (handling/fingering) | RFC overstated manipulative ability; significant bilateral manipulation limits would erode sedentary occupational base | Record (EMG mild, exam showing full grip and fine manipulation, daily activities) supports frequent—but not constant—handling/fingering limitation | RFC limiting to frequent handling/fingering is supported and VE testimony shows jobs exist; no remand required |
| ALJ’s application of SSR 12‑2p (fibromyalgia) | ALJ erred by failing to cite/apply SSR 12‑2p and did not adequately evaluate fibromyalgia’s waxing/waning effects | ALJ treated fibromyalgia as a medically determinable, severe impairment and applied SSR 96‑7p credibility principles to evaluate symptoms | Failure to cite SSR 12‑2p was harmless; ALJ applied the ruling’s principles and reasonably evaluated fibromyalgia symptoms |
| Credibility / symptom evaluation (naps, pain, concentration) | ALJ failed to credit plaintiff’s reports (need for prolonged naps, severe pain, cognitive fog) | ALJ relied on normal mental status findings, conservative treatment, unchanged prescriptions, activity level, and evidence suggesting symptom exaggeration | ALJ reasonably discounted some subjective complaints; credibility determination supported by record evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2009) (treating‑physician opinion controlling only if supported and consistent with the record)
- Wilson v. Commissioner, 378 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2004) (ALJ must give good reasons when discounting treating source opinions)
- Gayheart v. Commissioner, 710 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2013) (reiterating requirement that reasons for discounting treating opinions be supported and specific)
- Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931 (6th Cir. 2011) (administrative decision‑makers must explain weight given to treating opinions)
- Warner v. Commissioner, 375 F.3d 387 (6th Cir. 2004) (ALJ may reject treating opinion when contradicted by substantial evidence)
- Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1986) (substantial‑evidence standard and zone‑of‑choice principle)
- Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (U.S. 1971) (substantial evidence defined)
- Teverbaugh v. Commissioner, 258 F. Supp. 2d 702 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (VE testimony can support step‑five finding when jobs remain with RFC restrictions)