Hampton v. Hearn, 838 S.E.2d 650

On March 8, 2011, Dr. Andrew Hearn placed a ~60 mm self‑expanding venous stent at the junction of the left innominate vein and the superior vena cava (SVC) for a dialysis patient, Delacy Miles.
Three days later Dr. Gregory Schnier placed a permacath via the right internal jugular into the right atrium; he was not shown to have been informed the stent was obstructing the SVC.
During Schnier’s procedure the stent fractured and a portion migrated to the right ventricle, causing arrhythmia; the fragment was removed at Duke Hospital.
Plaintiff sued multiple providers, dismissed Schnier voluntarily pretrial, and proceeded to trial against Hearn. Plaintiff’s expert testified Hearn placed the stent too far and set up the fracture; defense experts said placement complied with the standard and the fracture was unforeseeable.
The trial court gave a requested jury instruction on intervening (superseding) negligence; the jury found Hearn not negligent. Plaintiff appealed, arguing (1) the intervening‑negligence instruction was unsupported by evidence and (2) a defense causation expert improperly opined on standard of care. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury on intervening (superseding) negligence	Instruction unsupported because no expert established Schnier’s standard, breach, and proximate causation—so insulating negligence instruction was improper	Evidence (plaintiff’s and defense experts) permitted reasonable inference that Schnier’s conduct could be an intervening, unforeseeable cause; instruction appropriate	Affirmed. Evidence supported giving the instruction and proximate‑cause questions were for the jury; no prejudice shown
Whether trial court erred by admitting portions of defense expert Dr. Rinaldi’s testimony that touched on stent placement/standard of care	Rinaldi was designated as causation expert only; his remarks on placement improperly invaded standard‑of‑care territory and were prejudicial	Any error was cured by the trial court’s limiting instruction telling jurors not to consider Rinaldi’s testimony on standard of care	Affirmed. No abuse of discretion; limiting instruction cured any potential prejudice

Estate of Hendrickson ex rel. Hendrickson v. Genesis Health Venture, Inc., 151 N.C. App. 139 (2002) (trial court must explain law and apply it to evidence; jury instructions reviewed in entirety)
Clarke v. Mikhail, 243 N.C. App. 677 (2015) (proximate cause is plaintiff’s burden; insulating negligence is an extension of proximate cause)
Harton v. Tel. Co., 141 N.C. 455 (1906) (defines efficient intervening cause that breaks causal chain)
Adams v. Mills, 312 N.C. 181 (1984) (test for insulating negligence focuses on reasonable foreseeability by original actor)
Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equip. Co., 310 N.C. 227 (1984) (defendant need not anticipate specific negligent acts of others; proximate cause often a jury question)
Barber v. Constien, 130 N.C. App. 380 (1998) (intervening/superseding negligence principles and when instruction is proper)
Chamberlain v. Thames, 131 N.C. App. 705 (1998) (limiting instruction can cure admission of erroneous testimony)