Hampton v. Cumberland Cty.Â
256 N.C. App. 656
| N.C. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- David and Mary Hampton bought a 74-acre rural-residential parcel in Cumberland County in 2011, obtained a USDA Farm Identification Number, and constructed 25–100 yard firing ranges beginning in 2012–2014.
- The Hamptons used the ranges for personal shooting, firearms instruction, and by appointment for family, friends, and "formal students;" they advertised training on a website and reported instructing dozens of people.
- In May 2015 a county code officer inspected the property and issued a Notice of Violations ordering removal of the range for lacking a county site plan and zoning permit.
- The Hamptons appealed to the Cumberland County Board of Adjustment (Board); the Board issued an order with limited factual findings and modified the remedy to cease use conflicting with the ordinance.
- The superior court reversed the Board, finding the Hamptons’ non-commercial use for target shooting and sighting with family/friends was a legal, incidental farm/home use.
- The Court of Appeals vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded: it held (1) a Farm Identification Number is not, as a matter of law, dispositive that every use on the property is a farm use exempt from zoning; and (2) the Board failed to make material factual findings (frequency, users, and nature of use), so the superior court erred by making its own factual findings and must remand to the Board for factfinding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hamptons) | Defendant's Argument (County) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a USDA Farm Identification Number alone makes later uses (firing ranges) exempt from zoning as "bona fide farm purposes" | Farm ID number constitutes sufficient evidence property is a bona fide farm; thus firing ranges incidental to farm/home use are exempt | A Farm ID number is not conclusive; non-farm uses on farm property remain subject to zoning; firing ranges may be non-farm/commercial | Farm ID number is not conclusive as matter of law; whether the range is a farm use is a factual question for the Board |
| Whether the Firing Range Amendment's "occasional target practice by individuals on property owned or leased by the individuals" exception applies | The use was occasional, non-commercial, and limited to family/friends (thus excepted) | The use was routine, involved formal training/students and advertised services, so it exceeded "occasional" and person-only exemption | Exception application depends on unresolved facts (frequency, nature, who used it); Board must make findings |
| Whether the superior court properly made factual findings and reversed the Board | Superior court found evidence uncontradicted and could resolve de novo | County argued superior court overstepped by making new factual findings contrary to Board's role | Superior court erred: it cannot make new factual findings on appeal; remand to Board required for material fact findings |
| Whether the Board's sparse findings were sufficient for appellate review | Hamptons relied on superior court resolution | County argued factual disputes existed (website ad, training) so findings were insufficient | Board's findings were insufficient; remand required under statutes for additional findings so appellate review can proceed |
Key Cases Cited
- Morris Commc'ns Corp. v. City of Bessemer City Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 365 N.C. 152 (N.C. 2011) (standard of review for board of adjustment legal conclusions)
- Fort v. County of Cumberland, 235 N.C. App. 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (de novo review of zoning ordinance interpretation)
- Nale v. Ethan Allen, 199 N.C. App. 511 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (appellate courts may not make findings of fact)
- Capricorn Equity Corp. v. Town of Chapel Hill Bd. of Adjustment, 334 N.C. 132 (N.C. 1993) (superior court sits as appellate court, not fact‑finder, in zoning appeals)
- Overton v. Camden County, 155 N.C. App. 391 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (enumerating scope of review on appeal from board of adjustment)
- ACT-UP Triangle v. Commission for Health Servs. of the State of N.C., 345 N.C. 699 (N.C. 1997) ("whole record" test for factual review)
- Myers Park Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Charlotte, 229 N.C. App. 204 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (distinguishing de novo and whole-record review in zoning context)
- Sun Suites Holdings, LLC v. Bd. of Aldermen of Town of Garner, 139 N.C. App. 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (when appellate court may decide merits despite trial error if dispositive)
- Welter v. Rowan County Bd. of Commissioners, 160 N.C. App. 358 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (interpretation may not resolve case without further factual findings)
- Sedman v. Rijdes, 127 N.C. App. 700 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (zoning exemption for bona fide farm uses limited to activities relating or incidental to agricultural production)
- North Iredell Neighbors for Rural Life v. Iredell County, 196 N.C. App. 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (industrial or non-farm processes on farm property are subject to zoning)
- County of Durham v. Roberts, 145 N.C. App. 665 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (incidental activities related to farming may be exempt)
- Baucom's Nursery Co. v. Mecklenburg County, 62 N.C. App. 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (non‑farm uses on farm property are subject to zoning)
- Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708 (N.C. 1980) (remand for additional factual findings when record lacks necessary findings)
- Deffet Rentals, Inc. v. City of Burlington, 27 N.C. App. 361 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (superior court may not make factual findings on review of board)
- Cannon v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Wilmington, 65 N.C. App. 44 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (trial court may recite largely uncontroverted evidence in findings)