Hampton v. Commissioner of Correction
167 A.3d 418
Conn. App. Ct.2017Background
- In 2003 Hampton and James Mitchell abducted, sexually assaulted, and shot a victim; Hampton held a shotgun and participated in some acts alleged by the victim.
- An amended information charged Hampton with multiple counts including: count seven — first‑degree sexual assault as a principal (fellatio and vaginal intercourse allegations); count eight — first‑degree sexual assault as an accessory (alleging he aided Mitchell’s vaginal intercourse).
- At trial the court mistakenly instructed the jury that count eight could be proved as principal, accessory, or Pinkerton vicarious liability, and that jury unanimity as to principal vs. accessory was not required for count eight.
- Defense counsel reviewed the charge at the charging conference, made no objection, and later, on direct appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court found the unanimity challenge waived.
- The jury acquitted Hampton on count seven (principal) and convicted him on count eight; Hampton later petitioned for habeas relief alleging ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to object to the count eight instruction.
- The habeas court assumed deficient performance but denied relief for lack of prejudice under Strickland, concluding the acquittal on count seven made it unlikely jurors convicted on count eight as principals — the jury most reasonably convicted on an accessorial theory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to jury instruction that allowed conviction on count eight as a principal when the information alleged only accessorial liability | Hampton: counsel’s failure to object permitted the jury to convict nonunanimously on count eight (some jurors may have found him guilty as principal for one act while others as accessory for another) | State: any instructional error did not prejudice Hampton because the jury acquitted him of principal liability on count seven and the evidence/closing argued count eight as accessorial | Affirmed: habeas court correctly found no reasonable probability of a different result; prejudice not established under Strickland |
| Whether a nonunanimous verdict on different theories (principal vs. accessory) undermines unanimity where multiple acts were alleged | Hampton: the instruction risked nonunanimity because three sexual acts were alleged and jurors could have split belief across acts/theories | State: principal and accessorial liability need not be conceptually distinct; moreover the amended information and prosecutor’s closing focused count eight on aiding Mitchell | Court: speculative juror confusion insufficient; acquittal on count seven makes accessorial conviction on count eight the reasonable inference |
| Whether factually inconsistent verdicts (acquittal on one count, guilty on another) warrant relief | Hampton: implied inconsistency supports prejudice | State: factually inconsistent verdicts are permissible and not grounds for relief | Court: inconsistent verdicts alone do not constitute legal prejudice; comparison of acquittal and conviction for legal consistency is improper |
| Whether the instructional error constituted structural error obviating the need to show prejudice | Hampton: did not assert structural error | State: no structural error argued; burden remains on Hampton to prove prejudice | Court: no structural error found or asserted; prejudice requirement under Strickland governs |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance — performance and prejudice)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (doctrine of vicarious liability for conspiracy)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to counsel and warnings; cited regarding confession issue)
- State v. Hampton, 293 Conn. 435 (2009) (Supreme Court opinion on direct appeal discussing waiver of unanimity challenge and proper charge for count eight)
- State v. Nash, 316 Conn. 651 (2015) (factually inconsistent jury verdicts are permissible)
- State v. Smith, 212 Conn. 593 (1989) (principal and accessorial liability not conceptually distinct for unanimity purposes)
- State v. Famiglietti, 219 Conn. 605 (1991) (remand for new trial for nonunanimous verdict only when alternatives are conceptually distinct and evidence supports each)