Hammons v. Hammons, 327 S.W.3d 444

Dr. Hammons died August 11, 2006, leaving Rosa as life tenant with all estate for her life.
Testator’s will vests Rosa with power to invade corpus for maintenance and medical care if income is insufficient.
Upon Rosa’s death, remaining estate assets go to Janet and Jillisa as remaindermen.
Janet and Jillisa allege they have rights to an accounting and inspection of Rosa’s assets.
Circuit Court granted summary judgment: Rosa has unconditional power to sell and Janet/Jillisa are contingent remaindermen; Court of Appeals affirmed.
This Court reverses on the remainder issue and affirms on the accounting/notion issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Do Janet and Jillisa have a vested remainder subject to divestment?	Janet and Jillisa contend they have a contingent remainder.	Rosa contends they hold a contingent remainder with no present right.	Janet and Jillisa have a vested remainder subject to divestment.
Is Rosa required to provide notice or an accounting when invading the corpus?	As life tenants with vested remainder, they seek notice/accounting rights.	Life tenants with explicit power to consume corpus need not account or notify absent waste.	No notice or accounting requirement; no duty to petition court absent waste.

Conlee v. Conlee, 190 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1945) (distinguishes contingent vs vested remainder; supports vesting with divestment)
Carroll v. Carroll's Ex'r, 58 S.W.2d 672 (Ky. 1933) (vested remainder despite conditional language)
Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Lane, 303 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1957) (vested remainder subject to divestment under life estate context)
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Tiffany, 260 S.W. 357 (Ky. 1924) (distinguishes contingent vs vested; divisibility by future events)