Hammerquist, P. v. Banka, V.
945 EDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Jan 31, 2017Background
- In 2007 Dolores R. Shields underwent coronary stent placements by Dr. Vidya Banka; plaintiffs later allege the stents were unnecessary.
- In April 2013 Pennsylvania Hospital notified Shields that some of Dr. Banka’s stent placements may have been unnecessary; independent review confirmed the 2007 stents were unnecessary.
- Shields filed a writ of summons March 27, 2015 and a complaint May 11, 2015 asserting claims including battery (lack of informed consent), common-law fraud, negligence/recklessness, corporate liability, and violations of the UTPCPL.
- Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings; the trial court granted dismissal with prejudice on March 2, 2016, holding the complaint was barred by MCARE’s seven‑year statute of repose.
- Shields died December 3, 2015; executrices were substituted and appealed. The Superior Court affirmed, adopting the trial court opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether MCARE’s 7‑year statute of repose bars the claims arising from the 2007 stent procedure | Shields: the stent placement was intentional/criminal/fraudulent and thus not a typical "healthcare service" subject to MCARE’s repose | Defendants: claims arise from furnishing of health‑care services and are therefore medical professional liability claims within MCARE’s repose | Held: MCARE applies; claims based on the 2007 procedure are barred because they are torts arising from health‑care services and the repose runs from date of procedure |
| Whether UTPCPL and common‑law fraud claims fall outside MCARE because they are statutory or not "torts or breaches of contract" | Shields: UTPCPL and statutory fraud are not traditional torts and MCARE did not clearly abrogate these statutory remedies | Defendants: UTPCPL/fraud claims seek damages from health‑care providers arising from furnishing of services and are functionally torts within MCARE’s definition | Held: Ambiguous statutory scope resolved in favor of MCARE; UTPCPL and fraud claims treated as medical professional liability claims and barred by repose |
| Whether continuing fraud/concealment or later treatment tolled or created claims within the 7‑year period | Shields: subsequent interactions/continuing concealment produced actionable conduct within seven years | Defendants: repose is absolute and not subject to discovery rule or concealment; complaint pleaded only the 2007 tort date | Held: Court limited review to the pleadings; complaint did not plead post‑2007 treatment/concealment as basis for new claims, and MCARE repose does not toll for concealment |
| Whether claims against hospital/health‑system (Penn Defendants) survive because their supervisory failures occurred within seven years | Shields: Penn Defendants failed to supervise and that failure continued into repose period, so claims against them are timely | Defendants: any supervisory failure after the 2007 tort could not have caused the original injury (the unnecessary stents) | Held: Issue waived for late raising and substantively dismissed for lack of causation — supervision failures could not have proximately caused Shields’ injury; claims barred by repose |
Key Cases Cited
- Osborne v. Lewis, 59 A.3d 1109 (Pa. Super. 2012) (MCARE statute of repose is absolute and not tolled by discovery or fraudulent concealment)
- Wexler v. Hecht, 928 A.2d 973 (Pa. 2007) (legislative context for MCARE and malpractice insurance concerns)
- Ash v. Continental Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 877 (Pa. 2007) (statutory remedies may create statutorily‑created torts)
- Gabriel v. O'Hara, 534 A.2d 488 (Pa. Super. 1987) (UTPCPL covers practices analogous to torts like fraud and false advertising)
- Knight v. Springfield Hyundai, 81 A.3d 940 (Pa. Super. 2013) (UTPCPL claims often analyzed under tort‑v‑contract framework)
- Kit v. Mitchell, 771 A.2d 814 (Pa. Super. 2001) (elements and proximate‑cause requirement for fraud claims)
- Whittington v. Episcopal Hosp., 768 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. 2001) (corporate negligence requires showing that institutional conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm)