622 S.W.3d 910
Tex. Crim. App.2021Background
- TDFPS investigated reports of potential sexual abuse of Hammack’s 16‑year‑old daughter and obtained an emergency Order of Protection of a Child and writ of attachment granting TDFPS sole custody and possession.
- Investigators attempted to serve Hammack at his home; he refused them and told them to return with a court order.
- Investigators took the child from school under the writ; Davidson later telephoned Hammack and told him TDFPS had custody and that he should come to the office for paperwork.
- The child later escaped TDFPS custody; police and investigators searched, found the child at family residences, and discovered Hammack hiding in an attic.
- Days later Hammack took the pregnant child to Oklahoma and consented to her marriage; she was recovered and Hammack was charged with interference with child custody, convicted, and placed on probation.
- On appeal Hammack argued the State failed to prove he knew he was violating the order because he was never formally served; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding service is not required if knowledge is proven circumstantially.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether proof of formal service is required to establish the knowledge element of Penal Code § 25.03(a)(1) (interference with child custody) | Service not required; statute only requires proof of knowledge and that can be established by circumstantial evidence; witnesses repeatedly informed Hammack that TDFPS had custody. | No proof Hammack was served or told the order’s contents; without service the State did not prove he knew he was violating a court order. | Service is not a statutory requirement; knowledge may be proven circumstantially. The evidence here was sufficient to infer Hammack knew of the emergency order and violated its terms; conviction affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes standard for sufficiency review)
- Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (apply Jackson standard; consider all evidence and reasonable inferences)
- Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (defines hypothetically correct jury charge)
- Harvey v. State, 78 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (distinguishes protective‑order statutes that include notice/service requirements)
- Ex parte Rhodes, 974 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (discusses knowledge requirement for violating custody/order)
- Briggs v. State, 807 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991) (similar facts: appellants informed CPS had custody though not formally served)
- Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (knowledge may be inferred from acts, words, and conduct)