Hamm v. Hazelwood, 787 S.E.2d 144

In 1989 Dorothy Bigelow Hamm conveyed her one-half interest in real property to her sister Melba Bigelow Clarke, reserving a life estate for Dorothy; Dorothy died in 2004 and her will left any interest to her son Edward Hamm.
The deed included a condition subsequent stating the property "shall AUTOMATICALLY REVERT" to Dorothy if Reginald Wayne Clarke (one of Melba’s children) ever acquired any interest in the property or was permitted to occupy it.
Melba died intestate in 2012; Melba’s heirs included Reginald.
The estate administrator (Hazelwood) petitioned to declare the possibility-of-reverter clause void as an impermissible restraint on alienation; Edward defended the clause as a lawful possibility of reverter limited in scope and duration.
The circuit court struck the clause as void; the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding the clause created an enforceable possibility of reverter that was reasonable in scope and duration.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Hazelwood)	Defendant's Argument (Hamm)	Held
Whether the deed's reversion clause is an invalid restraint on alienation	Clause is an unlawful restraint general as to time/person and thus void	Clause is a limited possibility of reverter directed at one person for a limited time and valid	The clause is a valid possibility of reverter, not an unlawful general restraint
Whether the conveyance created a fee simple absolute or a defeasible fee	Deed should be read as creating an absolute fee and the restriction is repugnant	Deed language (habendum, reservations) shows a defeasible fee subject to condition subsequent	Court finds deed conveys a fee simple defeasible (condition subsequent)
Whether reasonableness doctrine invalidates limited restraints on alienation	Historical rule against restraints should render the clause void	Reasonableness permits limited, person- and time-specific restraints	Court applies reasonableness and upholds the limited restraint
Whether the possibility-of-reverter is an enforceable property interest	Such clauses are effectively forfeitures and disfavored; should be voided	Possibility of reverter is a contingent but recognized property interest and may be enforced if clearly expressed	Court holds possibility of reverter is a property interest and enforceable here

Edwards v. Bradley, 227 Va. 224 (application of rule against absolute restraints on alienation)
Dunlop v. Dunlop's Ex'rs, 144 Va. 297 (will provision imposing unlimited forfeiture held void)
Pence v. Tidewater Townsite Corp., 127 Va. 447 (conditions subsequent and enforcement principles)
Sanford v. Sims, 192 Va. 644 (possibility of reverter recognized as property interest; right of re-entry principles)
Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. Windsor Indus., 272 Va. 64 (distinguishing contingent reverter interests and discussing entry requirement)
Camp v. Cleary, 76 Va. 140 (limited restraints on alienation may be reasonable)
Carneal v. Kendig, 196 Va. 605 (historical treatment of restraints on alienation)