HAMM v. HAMM, 350 P.3d 124

Sue Ann Hamm (Petitioner) and Harold Hamm (Respondent) divorced; district court entered decree (Nov 10, 2014) awarding Petitioner substantial real property, accounts, a 401(k), and property-division alimony totaling about $995,481,842 less interim distributions.
Respondent was ordered to convey property and make scheduled payments; by Jan 5, 2015 he conveyed all ordered assets and tendered a single check for the full alimony award, which Petitioner deposited and took possession of the awarded property.
Petitioner filed a Petition in Error (appeal) on Dec 5, 2014; Respondent filed a counter-appeal and later moved to dismiss Petitioner’s appeal after she accepted the payment and property.
The Supreme Court considered whether Petitioner’s acceptance of the judgment benefits waived her right to appeal under the "acceptance of benefits" doctrine and related exceptions.
The Court concluded Petitioner voluntarily accepted the benefits, rejecting her reliance on two narrow exceptions, and granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss her appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does acceptance of benefits waive right to appeal?	Hamm argued acceptance was to protect assets, not waive appeal; coercion/intrusiveness made refusal impractical.	Respondent argued voluntary acceptance of judgment benefits waives appellate rights.	Court: Yes — voluntary acceptance of benefits waived Petitioner’s right to appeal.
Does Stokes "necessity" exception apply?	Hamm invoked Stokes: acceptance necessary for support/maintenance.	Respondent: not a necessity case.	Court: No — exception is narrow ("food vs. appeal"); not met here.
Does "no-risk" exception (United Engines) apply?	Hamm argued risk of reduction on appeal is minimal; appeal should proceed.	Respondent: reversal could reduce award; risk exists.	Court: No — exception requires no risk; a non-negligible risk of less favorable result forecloses the exception.
Should appeal be dismissed while counter-appeal proceeds?	Hamm/ dissent argued inequitable to dismiss her appeal while allowing his counter-appeal; domestic relations context requires protective measures, not dismissal.	Respondent: dismissal appropriate because benefits were accepted.	Court: Majority dismissed Petitioner’s appeal; concurrence urged fairness concerns but still dismissed; dissent would have preserved appeal and used trial/appellate power to protect assets.

Ingram v. Groves, 202 P. 1019 (Okla. 1921) (acceptance of judgment benefits bars appeal)
Bras v. Gibson, 529 P.2d 982 (Okla. 1974) (acceptance-of-benefits doctrine applied)
Stokes v. Stokes, 738 P.2d 1346 (Okla. 1987) (narrow necessity exception for support/maintenance)
United Engines, Inc. v. McConnell Constr., Inc., 641 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1980) (no-risk exception to waiver must be no possibility of less favorable result)
Grand River Dam Authority v. Eaton, 803 P.2d 705 (Okla. 1990) (payment of judgment does not automatically waive appeal absent intent to compromise or to make relief impossible)
Stites v. DUIT Constr. Co., 903 P.2d 293 (Okla. 1995) (involuntary satisfaction preserves right to attack judgment; trial court retains power over post-satisfaction disputes)
In re Reid's Estate, 294 P.2d 544 (Okla. 1956) (protective acts to preserve rights do not necessarily constitute waiver)
Marshall v. Marshall, 364 P.2d 891 (Okla. 1961) (principles on when reversal cannot affect vested benefits)
Colclasure v. Colclasure, 295 P.3d 1123 (Okla. 2012) (standard for appellate review of property division in divorce)