Hamilton v. Kirson Alston v. 2700 Virginia
439 Md. 501
| Md. | 2014Background
- Two consolidated Maryland appeals (Hamilton v. Kirson; Alston v. 2700 Virginia Ave. Assocs.) arise from negligence claims by adults who alleged childhood lead poisoning from residences they lived in or visited.
- Plaintiffs lacked direct contemporaneous testing showing interior lead-based paint at the subject properties; experts relied on circumstantial indicators (house age, observed chipping paint, elevated childhood blood lead levels, limited exterior testing in Hamilton).
- Trial courts granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment, finding plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence to support causation and that experts lacked an adequate factual basis.
- Plaintiffs appealed, arguing circumstantial proof and expert opinion were sufficient under Dow and related precedents; courts of appeals affirmed and the Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to clarify the quantum of circumstantial evidence required.
- The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs may rely on circumstantial evidence, but must supply a theory of causation plus admissible supporting facts that permit reasonable—not speculative—inferences that the property contained lead-based paint at the relevant time and that it was a substantial contributor to exposure.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether circumstantial evidence alone can establish causation in a landlord lead-paint negligence claim | Plaintiffs: circumstantial evidence (age of house, peeling paint, elevated BLLs, children ingesting paint) suffices to infer the property contained lead and caused harm | Defendants: without direct interior testing or exclusion of other reasonable sources, plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence and experts’ opinions are speculative | Held: Circumstantial evidence can suffice, but must create a reasonable likelihood (not mere possibility) that the property contained lead at the relevant time and substantially contributed to exposure |
| Whether plaintiffs must exclude other possible sources to infer the property contained lead (Dow theory) | Plaintiffs: Dow allows inference from circumstantial evidence without requiring exclusivity of the source | Defendants: Plaintiffs must rule out other reasonably probable sources or the inference is unreliable | Held: If relying on a Dow-style process-of-elimination theory, plaintiffs must rule out other reasonably probable sources; but exclusion is not the only permissible circumstantial route—other factual patterns may also support inference |
| Admissibility of expert testimony tying property to lead exposure when experts rely on general assumptions (e.g., house age) | Plaintiffs: experts may rely on a mix of direct and circumstantial facts; their opinions bridge evidentiary gaps | Defendants: experts’ opinions lack sufficient factual basis if premised on bare assumptions and failure to eliminate other sources | Held: Expert opinion must rest on an adequate factual basis; where the basis is speculative or merely assumes lead presence from age alone, the testimony is inadmissible and cannot fill causal gaps |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate in these cases | Plaintiffs: factual disputes should preclude summary judgment | Defendants: plaintiffs failed to produce admissible evidence sufficient for a jury to find causation | Held: Summary judgment affirmed — plaintiffs failed to present admissible circumstantial proof (or sufficiently grounded expert opinion) to permit a reasonable inference that the subject properties contained lead-based paint and were substantial contributors to injuries |
Key Cases Cited
- Dow v. L & R Props., Inc., 144 Md. App. 67 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (circumstantial proof may permit inference that a residence contained lead when other sources are excluded)
- Ross v. Housing Auth. of Balt. City, 430 Md. 648 (Md. 2013) (articulates multi-link causation: property → exposure → elevated BLL → injury; permits circumstantial inferences where supported)
- Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70 (Md. 2003) (violation of housing code for peeling paint is prima facie evidence of negligence but plaintiff still must prove causation)
- West v. Rochkind, 212 Md. App. 164 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (process-of-elimination Dow application: when plaintiff spent time only at one property, exclusivity may justify inferring lead presence)
- Raymond Hamilton v. Dackman, 213 Md. App. 589 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (expert testimony cannot convert thin assumptions into reliable causation; plaintiff must prove presence of lead at the asserted site)
- Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9 (Md. 1970) (circumstantial proof of causation may suffice if it shows a reasonable probability rather than mere possibility)