Hamilton v. Dackman
213 Md. App. 589
| Md. Ct. Spec. App. | 2013Background
- Raymond, born 1992, lived at multiple Baltimore houses during childhood; Appleton Street was his father's home and a site he visited.
- From 1993 to 1997, Kennedy Krieger Institute reported elevated blood-lead levels in Raymond.
- Raymond sued in 2009 for negligence and consumer-protection claims against multiple Dackman defendants over lead paint exposure.
- Discovery revealed potential sources of exposure at Appleton Street, Harlem Avenue, and Fulton Avenue; some peeling lead paint existed.
- Raymond retained three experts; Arc exterior paint test found one positive surface; interior testing was not performed.
- Circuit Court granted summary judgment for Dackman; court relied on lack of interior testing and inability to rule out other sources.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Can circumstantial evidence establish causation without expert proof? | Raymond argues Dow-style circumstantial proof suffices. | Dackman contends expert causation proof is required and Appleton cannot be sole source. | Yes; but must show probability, not mere possibility; circumstantial link must be probative. |
| Is Appleton Street a probable lead source to Raymond's injuries? | Raymond's evidence shows exposure via Appleton Street; experts tie to injury. | Evidence is insufficient; only one exterior positive test and multiple potential sources exist. | Appleton Street not shown as a probable source; not enough to survive summary judgment. |
| Did the trial court err by excluding the experts' causation testimony? | Ross allows circumstantial proof without expert causation; experts should be allowed. | Experts lacked proper basis/qualifications and relied on assumptions. | Affirmed exclusion; Ross requires qualified experts with adequate factual basis; exclusion proper. |
| Does COMAR 26.16.01.03(A) create an evidentiary presumption of lead presence? | Regulation suggests presence of lead-containing substances presumption in pre-1950 buildings. | Regulation is for abatement safety, not evidentiary civil liability presumptions. | No evidentiary presumption for liability; regulation not controlling proof of causation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ross v. Housing Authority, 430 Md. 648 (Md. 2013) (circumstantial evidence can establish causation without expert testimony)
- Dow v. L&R Properties, 144 Md.App. 67 (Md. App. 2002) (circumstantial evidence can show a probable source of exposure)
- Taylor v. Fishkind, 207 Md.App. 121 (Md. App. 2012) (probability standard governs causation with or without expert testimony)
- Davis v. Goodman, 117 Md.App. 378 (Md. App. 1997) (common-sense rule on presence of lead based on environment)
- Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70 (Md. 2003) (notice not necessary where housing-code violation shown to cause injuries)
- Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70 (Md. 2003) (housing-code violation can support negligence claims)
