Hamilton County Education Ass'n v. Hamilton County Board of Education
822 F.3d 831
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- HCEA, the exclusive representative of Hamilton County professional employees under EPNA, entered a collective-bargaining agreement with the Board in 2011 that ran through June 30, 2014.
- Tennessee replaced EPNA with PECCA in 2011; PECCA became applicable to HCEA and the Board only after the 2014 contract expiration but reenacted the challenged EPNA prohibitions in substantively identical form.
- At an HCEA Representative Assembly in Sept. 2013, materials and remarks circulated that a teacher (Morgan) found intimidating; promotional material criticized a rival organization (PET); principals were encouraged to maintain HCEA membership.
- Stewart, the Board’s Asst. Superintendent for HR, sent a letter to HCEA’s president noting (1) principals/assistant principals are excluded from the professional unit under PECCA, (2) some Representative Assembly statements “could be construed as intimidating,” and (3) insulting references to PET; the letter asked HCEA to refrain from such statements and warned of possible retraction/clarification by the district.
- HCEA sued in state court alleging two violations of EPNA and a § 1983 claim for infringement of expressive association; the case was removed to federal court. After PECCA took effect between the parties, the district court granted the Board summary judgment; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether HCEA’s EPNA claims are moot after PECCA replaced EPNA | PECCA supplanted EPNA so claims under EPNA might be moot | PECCA reenacted the same prohibitions; claims remain live | Not moot: PECCA preserves the same provisions—substantive dispute remains |
| Whether Stewart’s letter violated EPNA § 49-5-606(a)(2) (interference/coercion) | Letter coerced or intimidated employees and restrained rights | Letter was protected employer expression under § 49-5-606(a)(5) and contained no threat | No violation: letter was protected expression and contained no threat of reprisal |
| Whether the Board’s letter violated EPNA § 49-5-606(a)(7) (domination/assistance of rival) | Letter interfered with HCEA administration and aided PET | Same defense: employer speech protection bars these claims absent threats | No violation: speech defense applies; no unlawful domination/assistance shown |
| Whether the Board’s letter burdened HCEA’s First Amendment right of expressive association | Letter significantly burdened membership/recruiting and chilled association | Letter did not prevent membership, solicitation, or advocacy; it merely requested restraint and threatened only protected corrective speech | No constitutional violation: no significant burden on expressive association |
Key Cases Cited
- NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1969) (discusses § 8(c) and employer speech balancing under First Amendment)
- Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (U.S. 2008) (notes congressional intent to encourage debate between labor and management)
- DTR Indus. v. NLRB, 39 F.3d 106 (6th Cir. 1994) (employer predictions of consequences of unionization treated as protected expression)
- Torbitt & Castleman, Inc. v. NLRB, 123 F.3d 899 (6th Cir. 1997) (test is whether statement has a tendency to coerce)
- Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (U.S. 1984) (standards for when government action impairs freedom of association)
- Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (U.S. 2000) (association impairment requires significant burden on membership or expression)