Hamer, Richard
WR-84,092-01
| Tex. App. | Nov 9, 2015Background
- On January 9, 2011 Richard Hamer, driving a Ford F-250, struck a red Saturn at an intersection in Houston; the Saturn's driver died and a passenger was left in a vegetative state.
- HPD reconstruction and witness statements concluded Hamer entered on a yellow/red signal at high speed (reconstruction estimated ~70 mph), did not brake, and struck the Saturn; posted speed limit was 45 mph.
- Hamer was indicted for manslaughter (recklessly causing death), appeared with counsel on January 20, 2012, entered an open guilty plea to manslaughter, and the court sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment.
- Hamer filed an art. 11.07 habeas application arguing trial counsel was ineffective for advising an open guilty plea to manslaughter without explaining that the facts supported the lesser offense of criminally negligent homicide.
- Key factual points cited by defense counsel (but allegedly not explained to Hamer) that they argue support negligence rather than recklessness: both vehicles were speeding; Hamer’s speedometer accuracy may have been affected by tire size; the yellow phase was shorter than recommended; a passenger believed there was time to clear the light; the other vehicle’s occupant had impairing substances in his system.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hamer) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Ineffective assistance of counsel re: plea advice | Counsel failed to investigate and advise that only criminally negligent homicide was supported; advising guilty to manslaughter was objectively unreasonable | Counsel (implied) represented plea was appropriate strategy; no plea agreement but counsel advised open plea | Not decided in memorandum (application seeks relief) |
| 2. Voluntariness/knowing nature of guilty plea | Plea was not knowing/voluntary because Hamer was not informed of elements/requirements or that lesser offense applied | Court accepted plea; State had evidence of recklessness from reconstruction and witnesses | Not decided in memorandum (application seeks relief) |
| 3. Proper statutory characterization (manslaughter vs. criminally negligent homicide) | Facts can be construed as criminal negligence, not recklessness; rule of lenity requires resolving ambiguity for lesser offense | State's reconstruction and witness testimony allegedly support recklessness element for manslaughter | Not decided in memorandum (application seeks relief) |
| 4. Prejudice under Strickland/Hill (would outcome differ?) | Reasonable probability Hamer would not have pled or would have been convicted of lesser offense if properly advised | State would rely on reconstruction/witnesses to show recklessness and that plea was voluntarily entered | Not decided in memorandum (application seeks relief) |
Key Cases Cited
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (U.S. 1963) (right to counsel in criminal prosecutions)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (Strickland standard applied to guilty-plea advice)
- Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (U.S. 1970) (requirements for voluntary, intelligent guilty pleas)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995) (standard for prejudice analogous to Strickland/Brady contexts)
- Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (U.S. 1993) (prejudice inquiry under Strickland)
- Cuellar v. State, 70 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (rule of lenity and statutory construction in penal cases)