Hall v. State Ex Rel. South Dakota Department of Transportation
806 N.W.2d 217
S.D.2011Background
- Landowners own property abutting former Exit 66 on I-90, a controlled-access highway near Ellsworth AFB.
- 1961 condemnation took part of Landowners’ property for I-90; the State offset severance damages for the remainder due to a designated special benefit (Exit 66 access).
- In 2003 the State closed Exit 66 to remove incompatible uses with Ellsworth AFB, replacing it with Exit 67 about a mile east.
- Landowners sued for inverse condemnation alleging damages from the 2003 access removal, claiming a second taking based on the prior designation of access.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, but the Supreme Court reversed, remanding for trial on damages, and addressing whether Landowners had a compensable right of access to a controlled-access highway.
- The Court analyzes whether a landowner abutting a controlled-access highway can recover damages when designated access was mitigated in a prior taking and later removed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2003 removal of designated access constitutes a compensable taking or damage. | Landowners rely on the special benefit designation and mitigation of damages in 1961. | Controlled-access statutes shield abutting owners from relying on access rights to a newly created limited-access highway. | Yes; removal of designated access is compensable damage (second taking). |
| Whether Landowners had a property right of indirect access to I-90 via Exit 66. | The 1961 designation created an indirect access right that mitigated damages. | Abutting owners have no right to indirect access on a controlled-access highway absent express grant. | Landowners possessed a compensable right arising from the initial designation of access, which could be lost and require compensation. |
| Whether contract releases and waivers foreclose Landowners’ claims for damages. | Release clauses do not bar constitutional damages for removal of designated access. | The option deed and warranty deed released access claims. | Release clauses do not contract away the constitutional right to damages for removal of designated access. |
| Whether Landowners proved the required special damages distinct from the public at large. | Damages were unique to Landowners due to the special benefit and its later removal. | Damages must be general or not peculiarly suffered by Landowners. | Special damages were proven; removal of designated access caused a unique injury to Landowners. |
Key Cases Cited
- Darnall v. State, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201 (1961) (no pre-existing right of access; later changes may require compensation)
- Hurley v. State, 82 S.D. 156, 143 N.W.2d 722 (1966) (compensation for loss of highway access when pre-existing access exists)
- Filler v. City of Minot, 281 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1979) (second taking when designated access is removed after mitigation of damages)
- Johnson Bros. Grocery v. State, Dep’t of Highways, 304 Minn. 75, 229 N.W.2d 504 (1975) (recognizes compensation for loss of access when access designated and later removed)
- Alsop v. State, 586 P.2d 1236 (Alaska 1978) (second taking when designated access is removed after reliance)
- Tucson Title Ins. Co. v. State, 101 Ariz. 416, 420 P.2d 287 (Ariz. 1966) (state must compensate when it substitutes plans and later eliminates designated access)
- Olson v. State, (Arizona case cited within) (Ariz. Ct. App.) (change-of-plans doctrine supporting compensation when plans relied upon)
- Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 (1932) (addressed general public harm vs. private injury; not controlling here)