Hall v. State
326 P.3d 1165
Or.2014Background
- Plaintiffs own a 25-acre parcel adjacent to I-5 in Linn County with billboard easements and an overpass access easement; loss of access would landlock the property.
- ODOT publicly sought to remove the Viewcrest interchange and contemplated eminent-domain acquisition, communicating this plan in meetings, in writing, and through public channels.
- ODOT publicized plans to eliminate the interchange, faced public opposition, and later delayed removal for three years in May 2002.
- Between 2005 and 2007, plaintiffs could not develop or sell the property due to perceived condemnation risk, while ODOT continued discussing removal as an option.
- ODOT argued planning for public use is not a taking unless all economically viable use is precluded; plaintiffs contended a nuisance-based, condemned-blight theory applies.
- In 2008 plaintiffs sued for inverse condemnation, alleging that ODOT’s repeated representations and conduct blighted their land and reduced its value; the trial court instructed the jury under a substantial-interference-with-use-and-enjoyment standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What standard applies to de facto takings from planning for public use | ODOT’s actions amount to condemnation blight reducing value | Planning for public use normally does not constitute a taking unless all viable use is precluded | De facto takings premised on planning require preclusion of all viable use or physical invasion; nuisancelike reduction alone is insufficient |
| Did Lincoln Loan’s condemnation-blight theory survive with current standards | Lincoln Loan supports nuisance-based condemnation blight | Lincoln Loan does not support taking without all viable-use preclusion or invasion | Condemnation blight is limited; not applicable here absent all-viable-use preclusion or invasion of rights |
| Were plaintiffs entitled to damages under nuisance theory given evidence only showed value reduction | Evidence showed nuisance-like interference with use and value reduction | No taking unless all viable use is precluded or there is substantial invasion | Evidence insufficient to establish a de facto taking; directed verdict for ODOT was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Lincoln Loan Co. v. State Hwy. Comm., 274 Or 49 (1978) (condemnation blight and substantial interference as inverse condemnation base)
- Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Wash. Co., 282 Or 591 (1978) (planning for public use generally not a taking; exceptions for preclusion of all viable use or irreversible intrusion)
- Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or 178 (1963) (nuisance-based inverse condemnation test for interference with use and enjoyment)
- Thornburg v. Port of Portland, Thornburg II, 244 Or 69 (1966) (proper test: interference must be direct, peculiar, and reduce FMV to warrant compensation)
- Suess Builders Co. v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or 254 (1982) (extension of planning/designation impact to precondemnation value effects; viability of blight theory)
- Coast Range Conifers v. Bd. of Forestry, 339 Or 136 (2005) (limits on de facto takings from regulation; precludes taking absent distinct exceptions)
- Dunn v. City of Milwaukie, 355 Or 339 (2014) (eminent-domain power de facto takings when government action deprives owner of property)
- Suess Builders Co. v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or 254 (1982) (recognizes condemnation blight exception to planning/designation rule)