862 N.W.2d 514
N.D.2015Background
- Harry L. Malloy owned mineral interests in a Dunn County tract; in May 1982 he and others conveyed those interests to trusts with him as trustee.
- A February 1983 divorce judgment (incorporating a settlement) stated Harry represented owning 2,222 net mineral acres and awarded Lorraine one-half of “his interest in and to the mineral acres,” and the judgment was recorded.
- In November 1983 Harry executed a quitclaim mineral deed to Lorraine; in 1995 Harry (individually and as trustee) quitclaimed interests to himself individually, and later conveyed acreage to Edwin Hall reserving 90% of minerals.
- Todd Hall (successor to Edwin) sued in 2013 to quiet title to 9 net mineral acres, asserting Harry’s 1983 divorce judgment/quitclaim did not convey minerals because Harry then held them as trustee; Family Mineral Trust asserted Lorraine owned one-half (45 acres) and thus Todd only received 4.5 acres.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Todd, holding the 1983 judgment and deed conveyed only Harry’s present interest (not a fee simple) and therefore the after-acquired title doctrine (N.D.C.C. § 47-10-15) did not apply; title to 9 net mineral acres was quieted to Todd.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hall) | Defendant's Argument (Family Mineral Trust / Lorraine) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 1983 divorce judgment was a "proper instrument" that conveyed fee simple (so after-acquired title would pass when Harry later reacquired title) | The judgment did not operate as a legally executed conveyance of fee simple; it only purports to convey Harry’s present interest and therefore does not trigger after-acquired title | The judgment is a proper instrument that intended to convey one-half of Harry’s mineral interest (with incorporated settlement language), so when Harry later reacquired title in 1995 Lorraine’s interest should vest by operation of law | The judgment conveyed only Harry’s present interest (similar to a quitclaim); it did not purport to grant fee simple, so § 47-10-15 does not apply |
| Whether a recorded divorce judgment can be considered an "instrument" under title 47 (affecting recording/operation) | Implied: judgments can be instruments under N.D. statutes and recording provisions, so the judgment should be effective to convey or operate for after-acquired title | Same as plaintiff’s framing but argues the instrument must purport to grant fee simple to trigger after-acquired title | Court held that under North Dakota law a judgment can be an "instrument" for title-recording purposes, but § 47-10-15 requires the instrument to purport to grant a fee simple; the 1983 judgment did not do so |
| Whether the after-acquired title doctrine applies when the grantor was a trustee (i.e., whether a trustee’s lack of authority at time of conveyance prevents later vesting of title in grantee) | Hall: because Harry held the minerals as trustee at the time of the 1983 judgment, that judgment could not convey title; and after-acquired title doctrine does not operate because the instrument did not purport to grant fee simple | Family Mineral Trust: after-acquired title doctrine should operate when Harry later reacquired title individually, vesting Lorraine with one-half under the 1983 instrument | Court: after-acquired title doctrine is inapplicable here because the 1983 instrument did not purport to grant fee simple; trustee status supports conclusion that judgment conveyed only Harry’s interest, not fee simple |
Key Cases Cited
- McKenzie Cnty. v. Hodel, 467 N.W.2d 701 (N.D. 1991) (state court judgments can directly affect title to in-state real property)
- Carkuff v. Balmer, 795 N.W.2d 303 (N.D. 2011) (after-acquired title depends on conveying language; quitclaim-type language generally conveys only present interest)
- Torgerson v. Rose, 339 N.W.2d 79 (N.D. 1983) (definition of after-acquired title doctrine)
- Hoag v. Howard, 55 Cal. 564 (Cal. 1880) (judgment is not an "instrument" under analogous California statutory scheme)
- Sullivan v. Quist, 506 N.W.2d 394 (N.D. 1993) (principles for construing judgments; give effect to the literal meaning when unambiguous)
- Henry S. Grinde Corp. v. Klindworth, 44 N.W.2d 417 (N.D. 1950) (definition and scope of fee simple estate)