895 F.3d 146
1st Cir.2018Background
- Hajdusek enrolled in the Marine Corps Delayed Entry Program (DEP), a poolee not yet an active-duty Marine and not entitled to DoD/VA benefits.
- Staff Sergeant Mikelo, supervising the local DEP, ordered Hajdusek to attend a March 1 physical training session; the workout was substantially longer and more intense than prior sessions.
- After the session Hajdusek collapsed, developed rhabdomyolysis and other conditions, and is left permanently disabled.
- Hajdusek sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligent exercise supervision caused his injuries.
- The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the FTCA discretionary function exception; the First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mikelo's decision to impose the workout is discretionary and thus barred by the FTCA discretionary function exception | Hajdusek: decision was mere implementation of settled Marine Corps policy (professional negligence), not discretionary policy judgment | U.S.: DEP guidance leaves training details to individual Marines; choosing intensity/duration requires policy balancing (training vs. attrition) and is discretionary | Held: Decision was discretionary and susceptible to policy analysis; exception applies and bars the claim |
| Whether Marine Corps guidance creates a waiver of sovereign immunity for injuries from certain activities | Hajdusek: guidance recognizing "high-risk" activities implies FTCA waiver for related injuries | U.S.: Waivers are strictly construed; guidance does not plainly waive immunity for ordinary exercise supervision | Held: No waiver shown; guidance doesn't clearly cover alleged exercise negligence |
| Relevance of operational vs. planning-level analysis (Gaubert/Scalia) | Hajdusek: reliance on Justice Scalia's concurrence to argue operational-level acts are unshielded | U.S.: Controlling Gaubert standard governs; even Scalia's approach would not change result because Mikelo's duties included balancing relevant considerations | Held: Gaubert controls; action is protected. Even under Scalia's concurrence, result would be the same here |
| Whether the alleged conduct was so patently unreasonable that it falls outside the discretionary-function shield | Hajdusek: workout was objectively unreasonable and thus not protected | U.S.: Allegations describe an unusually intense workout but not a decision that objectively rejects safety concerns | Held: Complaint lacks facts showing patent unreasonableness; discretionary-function protection remains intact |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (policy-susceptibility test for discretionary function exception)
- Shansky v. United States, 164 F.3d 688 (distinguishing professional implementation from discretionary policy balancing)
- Fothergill v. United States, 566 F.3d 248 (decisions balancing multiple policy factors are protected)
- Evans v. United States, 876 F.3d 375 (de novo review of discretionary-function dismissals)
- Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520 (Rule 12(b)(1) pleading and jurisdictional standards)