Hailes v. State, 113 A.3d 608

Background

Victim Melvin Pate was shot on Nov. 22, 2010, sustaining a cervical injury that left him quadriplegic and unable to speak; doctors at Shock Trauma told him he had about 24 hours to live.
On Nov. 26, 2010, while restrained and communicating only by blinking, Pate identified Jermaine Hailes from a photo array as his shooter; Pate later survived and died in Nov. 2012 from complications of the wound.
Hailes was charged with first‑degree murder; he moved to suppress Pate’s pretrial identification as hearsay and, if testimonial, barred by the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.
The circuit court found Pate’s identification a dying declaration but ruled it testimonial and thus inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause, granting suppression.
The State appealed; the Court of Special Appeals reversed and this Court granted certiorari to decide (1) State appealability under CJP § 12‑302(c)(4)(i), (2) whether Pate’s statement was a dying declaration, and (3) whether the Confrontation Clause applies to dying declarations.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Hailes)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether State may appeal suppression under CJP § 12‑302(c)(4)(i)	Statute authorizes appeals only for exclusion of tangible "seized" property or where there was an alleged prior constitutional seizure	Legislative history and purpose show the provision covers exclusion of intangible evidence and exclusions based on admission‑stage constitutional violations	State may appeal; § 12‑302(c)(4)(i) covers intangible evidence and admissions‑stage constitutional rulings
Whether Pate’s identification was a dying declaration under Md. R. 5‑804(b)(2)	Pate’s condition had stabilized two days after prognosis and he died two years later, so he lacked genuine belief of imminent death	Circumstantial and direct evidence (doctor’s prognosis, Pate’s tears, life‑support status) show he believed death was imminent when he spoke	Court affirmed dying‑declaration finding; belief in imminent death can be shown circumstantially and time to death is not dispositive
Whether the Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial dying declarations	Even testimonial dying declarations must satisfy Confrontation Clause; admission without cross‑examination violates Sixth Amendment	Dying declarations were an established common‑law exception to confrontation at founding and thus the Clause does not apply	Confrontation Clause does not apply to dying declarations; historical exception survives Crawford framework
Whether the testimonial/non‑testimonial distinction matters for dying declarations	Testimonial status controls admissibility under Crawford	Dying declarations are sui generis; testimonial label irrelevant because Clause inapplicable	Court need not decide testimonial status; dying declarations exempt from Confrontation Clause

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (establishes that testimonial hearsay is barred by the Confrontation Clause absent unavailability and prior cross‑examination)
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (discusses historical exceptions to confrontation, including dying declarations and forfeiture by wrongdoing)
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (recognizes dying declarations as longstanding exception to confrontation)
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) (explains dying‑declaration exception existed before the Constitution and was not abrogated)
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (notes recognized exceptions to confrontation such as dying declarations)
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (observes dying declarations are long‑recognized exceptions to confrontation)
Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (earlier Mattox decision discussing factors relevant to dying declarations)
Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325 (2000) (construed limits on State appeals under § 12‑302 and parsing of statutory text)
Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543 (1961) (Maryland precedent on indicators that a statement qualifies as dying declaration)