Haight v. Minchak (Slip Opinion)
58 N.E.3d 1135
Ohio2016Background
- Plaintiffs Haight and Pence were sales representatives for Cheap Escape Company and sued after their employer reduced or withheld draw payments, claiming those reductions produced pay below Ohio's constitutional minimum wage.
- They brought a class action seeking a declaration that portions of R.C. 4111.14 were unconstitutional, injunctive relief, unpaid wages, and treble damages under Article II, Section 34a of the Ohio Constitution (the Fair Minimum Wage Amendment).
- Article II, Section 34a provides that terms like “employee” have the same meanings as under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), but adds specific exemptions and states “Only the exemptions set forth in this section shall apply.”
- The General Assembly enacted R.C. 4111.14(B)(1), which adopts FLSA definitions and expressly excludes individuals excluded under 29 U.S.C. §203(e) and those exempted under 29 U.S.C. §213 (federal exemptions such as outside salespersons).
- The trial court upheld R.C. 4111.14(B)(1) as constitutional; the Second District Court of Appeals reversed, holding the statute impermissibly narrowed the constitutional definition.
- The Ohio Supreme Court granted review and reversed the appellate court, holding the statutory definition does not clearly conflict with the constitutional provision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Haight/Pence) | Defendant's Argument (Minchak) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 4111.14(B)(1) conflicts with Article II, §34a’s definition of “employee” | §34a incorporates only the FLSA definition in 29 U.S.C. §203(e); §4111.14 adds extra exemptions and thus narrows the Constitution | §34a incorporates the FLSA generally; the statute merely implements and clarifies by adopting federal exclusions and exemptions | R.C. 4111.14(B)(1) is constitutional; the FLSA “meanings” (including exclusions/exemptions) are incorporated and the statute does not clearly conflict with §34a |
| Whether the constitutional phrase “Only the exemptions set forth in this section shall apply” precludes incorporation of other FLSA exemptions | That clause limits applicable exemptions to those listed in the amendment; other FLSA exemptions cannot be applied by statute | The amendment’s reference to meanings under the FLSA and use of plural “meanings” shows the FLSA’s exclusions/exemptions are incorporated; added listed exemptions do not preclude others already incorporated | The Court held the clause does not preclude incorporation of FLSA exemptions; both the constitutional text and legislative history support treating FLSA exemptions as within the incorporated meanings |
| Whether §34a is self-executing and whether R.C. 4111.14(B)(1) applies to constitutional claims | Plaintiffs argued the statute should not limit constitutional claims and that §34a’s text controls directly | Defendants argued supplemental legislation can implement and clarify §34a and its reference to federal law supports the statute’s applicability | The Court found it unnecessary to decide self-execution because both §34a and R.C. 4111.14 include FLSA exemptions; statute applies consistently with the amendment |
| Standard for invalidating the statute | Statute must be shown to be clearly incompatible with the Constitution beyond a reasonable doubt | Legislature may pass implementing laws unless specifically prohibited by the Constitution | Applying the presumption of constitutionality and liberal saving construction, the Court upheld the statute |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 128 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 1955) (presumption of constitutionality; challenger must show clear incompatibility)
- Desenco, Inc. v. Akron, 706 N.E.2d 323 (Ohio 1999) (statutes should be liberally construed to save them from constitutional infirmity)
- DiCenzo v. A-Best Prods. Co., 897 N.E.2d 132 (Ohio 2008) (doctrine on prospective application of invalid statutes)
- Univ. Hts. v. O’Leary, 429 N.E.2d 148 (Ohio 1981) (burden on challenger to prove statute unconstitutional)
- State ex rel. Jackman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 224 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio 1967) (state Constitution limits legislative power; legislature may act unless constitutionally prohibited)