Haggins v. VERIZON NEW ENGLAND, INC.
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15504
| 1st Cir. | 2011Background
- Between Nov 2008 and Feb 2009 VNE required field technicians to carry company phones with GPS, to monitor location via Field Force Manager (FFM).
- The unionized COEI Techs were governed by a CBA with Management Rights clause giving VNE broad control over operations.
- The GPS-equipped phones were claimed to invade privacy under Massachusetts constitutional and statutory law, and to affect third-party beneficiaries under a Verizon Wireless contract.
- NLRB unfair labor practice charge was filed in Jan 2009 and deferred to arbitration; the Massachusetts state court suit followed in June 2009 after removal to federal court.
- The district court granted summary judgment for VNE on privacy claims as § 301 preempted and dismissed the third-party beneficiary claim for lack of evidence of intended beneficiary status; the First Circuit affirmed.
- The court held that Livadas does not control because the issue is the proper scope of the underlying right, not a waiver; the third-party beneficiary claim failed as a matter of state law and was preempted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 301 preempts the privacy claims | Plaintiffs argue claims are not preempted | VNE contends preemption under § 301 and Garmon | Preemption applies; claims depend on CBA interpretation |
| Whether Livadas requires a 'clear and unmistakable waiver' to preempt | Livadas controls preemption for waivers | Livadas not applicable to this nonnegotiable right situation | Livadas not controlling; scope of right governs preemption |
| Whether the third-party beneficiary claim survives | Claim should be viable if contract intended beneficiaries | No evidence of intended third-party beneficiary status | Third-party beneficiary claim failures; dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1988) (preemption of privacy claims under § 301 depends on CBA interpretation)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (U.S. 1988) (require clear and unmistakable waiver for waiver-based preemption)
- Flibotte v. Pa. Truck Lines, Inc., 131 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1997) (state-law claims preempted if depend on meaning of CBA)
- Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (U.S. 1994) (no preemption when state-law rights nonnegotiable or non-bargained away)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1985) (labor contracts as the vehicle for § 301 preemption)
- Bratt v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 467 N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 1984) (privacy/management rights analysis)
- Miller v. Mooney, 431 Mass. 57, 725 N.E.2d 545 (Mass. 2000) (third-party beneficiary must be intended by contract)
- Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1960) (industrial common law as part of CBA interpretation)