Haggart v. United States
108 Fed. Cl. 70
Fed. Cl.2012Background
- Rails-to-trails takings case in King County, Washington; 522 plaintiffs in six subclasses seek just compensation for trail use on former railroad right-of-way.
- Rights-of-way originated 19th–20th century via deeds/condemnations/adverse possession; Burlington Northern converted segments to public trail under Trails Act § 208 and NITU process.
- STB issued NITUs enabling rail-banking and trail use; government liability hinges on scope of easements and whether trail use exceeded railroad purposes.
- Subclass Two holds easement scope limited to railroad purposes; Subclass Four categories A–D largely show easements, not fees; Subclass Four category E held as fee simple and dismissed.
- Damages computed as difference between unencumbered fee value and value burdened by trail easement; before-state treated as unencumbered in many Subclass Two/4 questions; ownership disputes reserved for trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of easement: did trail use exceed railroad purposes | Subclass Two plaintiffs contend trail use falls outside easement | Government argues trail use is within broad easements or rail-related purposes | Trail use not within railroad purposes; government liable for taking where NITU authorized broader use |
| Ownership: who owned the underlying fee at taking date | Plaintiffs hold centerline centerline presumption from deeds; ownership at NITU date | Rely on chain-of-title evidence and metes-and-bounds references to rebut presumption | Centerline presumption applies to many parcels; ownership summary judgment granted where uncontroverted by government |
| Subclass Four: whether Category A–D deeds convey easement or fee | Deeds show 'right of way' for railroad; presumption easement | Brown factors and recent Washington rulings could imply fee in some deeds | Categories A–D convey easements; Category E conveys a fee; summary judgment for easement on A–D, fee on E |
| Damages: proper measure of just compensation | Before value should be unencumbered land absent Trails Act impact | Before value should reflect burdened value under existing easement/limitations | Damages measured as difference between unencumbered fee and encumbered value; before-state unencumbered baseline |
Key Cases Cited
- Preseault v. United States (Preseault II), 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed.Cir.1996) (three-part takings framework for rails-to-trails—ownership, scope, termination; trail use must be outside original easement scope to constitute taking)
- Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015 (Fed.Cir.2010) (trail use outside scope of easement constitutes taking)
- Roeder Co. v. Burlington N. Inc., 716 P.2d 859 (Wash. 1986) (highway/railroad centerline presumption; extrinsic evidence allowed in railroad deeds)
- Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban Lines Ass’n, 126 P.3d 16 (Wash. 2006) (presumption of easement when granting clause conveys right of way; Brown factors used to rebut)
- Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371 (Fed.Cir.2004) (court recognizes that trail use is not a railroad purpose; but taking depends on state-law scope of easement)