Haggart v. United States
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 218
| Fed. Cir. | 2016Background
- Owners of parcels in King County sued the United States under the Tucker Act/Trails Act, alleging a taking when rail corridors were converted to trails; class was certified and narrowed to 253 members.
- Before certification, class counsel had contingency-fee agreements with ~68 class members (35%), but not with the majority (~185) who later opted in.
- Parties negotiated a $110,000,000 settlement (plus accrued interest) for the class; the Government also agreed to pay statutory URA attorney fees and costs.
- The Claims Court preliminarily approved the settlement and awarded class counsel additional fees under the common-fund doctrine (scaled percentage of the recovery), while allowing the statutory URA fee to be paid separately.
- Two class members (the Woodleys) objected, arguing (among other things) that class counsel failed to disclose the appraisal spreadsheets and methodology used to calculate individual awards; the Government later confessed error and joined the objectors on key points.
- The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded: it held the Claims Court abused its discretion by approving the settlement without requiring disclosure of valuation methodology and held the common-fund award was precluded by the URA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing / Government participation | Woodleys: objectors have standing; Government may defend statutory interests. | Haggarts: Government lacks standing to challenge counsel's fee award. | Government has institutional interest and may litigate fee issues; standing exists. |
| Waiver / Judicial estoppel for Government | Woodleys/Gov: Government may raise confessed errors on appeal. | Haggarts: Gov sat silent below and should be estopped/waived from arguing now. | No waiver or judicial estoppel; Government's change was not inconsistent argument warranting estoppel. |
| Adequacy of disclosure re: valuation methodology | Woodleys & Gov: class counsel withheld spreadsheets, appraisals, and representative-parcel inputs necessary to evaluate individual awards. | Haggarts: Counsel explained methodology and provided sufficient information under RCFC 23(e). | Court abused discretion: class counsel must provide necessary documentation (representative-appraisals and spreadsheets) so class members can assess fairness. Settlement approval vacated for inadequate disclosure. |
| Application of common-fund doctrine and URA interplay | Haggarts/class counsel: a common fund exists; equitable common-fund fees may supplement statutory fees (and contingency contracts still enforceable for signatories). | Government & Woodleys: no equitable basis to apply common-fund where URA mandates payment of reasonable attorney fees; common-fund recovery would duplicate contingency/multiplier and undermine URA. | Although a common fund existed, the URA’s statutory fee remedy displaces application of the common-fund doctrine here; awarding common-fund fees on top of URA statutory fees was precluded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (Sup. Ct.) (foundation for common-fund doctrine)
- Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82 (Sup. Ct.) (contingent-fee contracts not invalidated by statutory fee awards in civil-rights context)
- City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (Sup. Ct.) (lodestar rule and limits on multipliers under fee-shifting statutes)
- Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (Sup. Ct.) (limits on equitable doctrines where statute provides the rule)
- Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (Sup. Ct.) (treatment of prospective/common funds in equity)
- Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir.) (discussion permitting aggregation to describe a common fund)
- Pierce v. Visteon Corp., 791 F.3d 782 (7th Cir.) (holding common-fund doctrine generally inapplicable where fee-shifting statute governs)