Hagen v. Siouxland Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C.
23 F. Supp. 3d 991
N.D. Iowa2014Background
- Dr. Edward Hagen sued Siouxland Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. and partners for wrongful discharge in violation of Iowa public policy.
- Jury found Hagen was wrongfully discharged based on Protected Conduct 3, 4, and 5 and awarded past lost earnings only.
- Protected Conduct 3: reporting to St. Luke’s hospital about nurses’ potential malpractice; 4: disclosing to a patient that malpractice may have occurred; 5: consulting with attorneys about whether to report to the Iowa Board of Medicine or hospital.
- Incident at St. Luke’s on Nov. 5, 2009 involving a decedent fetus; Hagen reported concerns to hospital staff and later consulted attorneys about reporting obligations.
- Siouxland moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial; Hagen moved for additur and pre-/post-judgment interest. Iowa Supreme Court certified questions, then declined to answer; court proceeded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are Protected Conduct 3, 4, or 5 actionable under Iowa public policy? | Hagen argues 3, 4, 5 are protected activities. | Siouxland contends none are protected. | Protected Conduct 3, 4, and 5 are actionable. |
| Can a contractual employee sue for wrongful discharge under Iowa public policy? | Hagen asserts both at-will and contractual employees may recover. | Siouxland contends only at-will employees may recover. | wrongful discharge applies to both at-will and contractual employees (court finds in Hagen's favor on this point). |
| Was there sufficient evidence the firing was caused by Protected Conduct 3 or 5? | Evidence shows Hagen was fired after reporting the nurses and Eastman and after attorney consultations. | Evidence does not prove firing was due to protected conduct. | There is sufficient evidence that firing was due to Protected Conduct 3 and 5. |
| Should the jury have an explicit override-by-business-justification element or is it implicit in causation? | No separate instruction required beyond showing determining factor. | An overriding business justification should be explicit. | Instruction No. 5 adequately submitted the issues; overriding business justification narrow concern; no separate instruction required. |
| Is Hagen entitled to additur and/or pre-/post-judgment interest after the verdict? | Hagen seeks additur for future losses; interest on past losses. | Additur unconstitutional under Seventh Amendment; interest should be limited. | Additur denied; pre- and post-judgment interest granted (prejudgment from 5/19/2011; post-judgment per 28 U.S.C. 1961). |
Key Cases Cited
- Craig Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Viacom Outdoor, Inc., 528 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 2008) (neutral review of conflicting inferences for jury verdicts)
- Heaton v. The Weitz Co., Inc., 534 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard for review of jury verdicts; complete absence of probative facts)
- United Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 419 F.3d 743 (8th Cir. 2005) (evidence evaluation in employment-discrimination context)
- Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 2009) (elements of wrongful discharge claim including overriding business justification)
- Novak v. Gramm, 469 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1972) (damages are in dispute; additur limitations under Seventh Amendment)
- Am. Bank of St. Paul v. TD Bank, N.A., 713 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2013) (Rule 59(e) as vehicle for additur in post-trial motion)
- Trinity Prods., Inc. v. Burgess Steel, L.L.C., 486 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 2007) (prejudgment interest in diversity cases governed by state law)