Hafed v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2011 WL 338417

Hafed, a federal prisoner, appears pro se and seeks to proceed ifp on appeal.
This court clarifies what constitutes a “strike” under the PLRA (28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)) for future ifp eligibility and when a strike ripens.
Jennings v. Natrona Cnty. Det. Ctr. Med. Facility is cited for strikes under § 1915(e)(2)(B), but the court now extends to § 1915A dismissals.
The court holds that a § 1915A dismissal counts as a strike if the dismissal is for frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim, mirroring § 1915(g) grounds.
The court identifies three prior strikes—two in district court and one in the Seventh Circuit—before Hafed filed No. 09-1365, triggering § 1915(g) prepayment unless the imminent-danger exception applies.
No. 09-1365 challenged a district court’s final dismissal with prejudice for deposition noncompliance; No. 09-1090 challenged magistrate rulings on injunctive-relief motions and denial of reconsideration; the appeals are otherwise bound up in the three-strikes analysis and fee payment rules.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does a §1915A dismissal count as a strike?	Hafed argues §1915A dismissals should count as strikes.	The court should count dismissals under §1915A as strikes only when they align with §1915(g) grounds.	Yes; §1915A frivolous/malicious/failure-to-state-dismissals count as strikes.
When do strikes ripen for §1915(g) purposes?	Hafed contends date for ripening should be based on appeals timing.	Strike ripens from the Supreme Court’s cert denial/dismissal (or expiry if no cert) or from expiry of direct-appeal time if no direct appeal.	Strikes ripen from cert denial/dismissal or cert expiry; if no direct appeal, from expiry of appeal time.
Did Hafed have three strikes before No. 09-1365?	Hafed contends there were fewer than three strikes prior to filing.	Court found three clear strikes based on prior dismissals.	Yes; Hafed had three strikes as of May 26, 2009.
Does Hafed satisfy the imminent-danger exception to prepayment?	Hafed argues imminent danger justified proceeding without prepayment.	Imminent-danger requires specific, credible allegations at filing; Hafed’s allegations were vague.	No; Hafed failed to allege imminent danger sufficient to meet the exception.
What are the consequences for the No. 09-1365 and No. 09-1090 appeals?	N/A	N/A	No. 09-1365 must be paid in full or be dismissed; No. 09-1090 may be moot if No. 09-1365 is not reached.

Jennings v. Natrona Cnty. Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775 (10th Cir. 1999) (addressed § 1915(e)(2)(B) strikes; later extended to § 1915A)
Dubuc v. Johnson, 314 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2003) (prepayment rule clarified in context of strikes)
United States v. Burch, 202 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2000) (discussed timing of filing periods in related context)
Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 492 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (dismissal for nonpayment treated as strike when tied to frivolousness)
Butler v. Dep’t of Justice, 492 F.3d 440 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (dismissal for failure to prosecute can count as strike where merits not shown)
Davis v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 507 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007) (prematurity/nuances of state action claims and strikes)
White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1998) (imminent danger requires specific, credible allegations)
Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1987) (frail framework for sua sponte frivolous dismissal)
Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 2001) (imminent danger exception specifics)