Hadley v. Subscriber Doe
34 N.E.3d 549
| Ill. | 2015Background
- In December 2011 an anonymous commenter using the alias “Fuboy” posted on the Freeport Journal Standard website that plaintiff Bill Hadley was “a Sandusky waiting to be exposed” and referenced a nearby elementary school; Hadley sued for defamation.
- Hadley obtained the commenter’s IP address from the newspaper and subpoenaed Comcast for subscriber information; federal proceedings (including a motion to quash) occurred during related litigation and were later dismissed when the publisher was dismissed.
- Hadley filed a circuit‑court defamation complaint against “Subscriber Doe a/k/a Fuboy” and, at the court’s direction, added a count seeking disclosure of the Comcast subscriber identity under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224.
- The circuit court held Hadley’s defamation claim could survive a 2‑615 motion and granted Rule 224 relief (with notice to the subscriber); the appellate court affirmed (one justice dissenting).
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave, addressed several procedural objections raised by Fuboy, and affirmed the appellate court, remanding for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Hadley’s Argument | Fuboy’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the original complaint (naming an alias) was a legal nullity under Bogseth | Original complaint valid because it sued a known alias used by defendant, not a fictitious unknown John Doe | Bogseth means complaints that use fictitious names are void, so the suit is time‑barred | Court held complaint was valid; Bogseth inapplicable where plaintiff sued a known alias voluntarily adopted by defendant |
| Whether seeking Rule 224 relief after filing suit amounted to abandoning the original claim and barred relief by SOL | Proceeding under court instruction; Rule 224 invocation post‑filing should not automatically dismiss the suit | Rule 224 contemplates a separate pre‑suit action; Hadley’s post‑filing Rule 224 petition is improper and time‑barred | Court declined to impose dismissal as a sanction; procedural irregularity not fatal but advised Rule 224 should normally be used pre‑suit |
| Proper standard to establish “necessity” under Rule 224 in defamation cases | Necessity should be shown by allegations sufficient to survive a section 2‑615 motion to dismiss (prima facie defamation) | Argued for a heightened standard (e.g., Dendrite/Cahill summary judgment‑type test) to protect anonymous speech | Court adopts the 2‑615 standard: Rule 224 petitions must plead facts that would withstand a 2‑615 motion |
| Whether Fuboy’s online comment was actionable defamation per se (fact vs. opinion; innocent construction) | The comment imputed criminal conduct (sexual abuse) in light of contemporaneous Sandusky news and was reasonably read as factual | Statement was opinion, political hyperbole, or susceptible to innocent construction; not actionable | Court held the statement could reasonably be read as factual imputing child sexual abuse (defamatory per se), not entitled to innocent construction or First Amendment protection |
Key Cases Cited
- Bogseth v. Emanuel, 166 Ill. 2d 507 (1995) (general rule that suits against fictitious parties are invalid and respondent‑in‑discovery requires at least one real defendant)
- Maxon v. Ottawa Publishing Co., 402 Ill. App. 3d 704 (2010) (endorses 2‑615 pleading standard for Rule 224 necessity in defamation cases)
- Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490 (2006) (defines defamatory statements and the innocent construction rule)
- Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558 (2006) (opinion vs. fact analysis; test for whether statement reasonably asserts provable fact)
- Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d 478 (2009) (standard for reviewing a section 2‑615 motion — legal sufficiency of complaint)
- National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (explains basic technical function of IP addresses)