Hacker, Anthony Wayne
2013 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 157
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2013Background
- Appellant Hacker was on deferred-adjudication probation for assaulting his wife; condition 22 barred contact with the complainant except for telephone talks about child custody; he had a long-running arrangement to babysit children at his wife’s home when she worked; the State moved to revoke based on alleged probation violations; evidence included a crossed-out home address on intake, testimony about custody arrangements, and conduct at the wife’s residence; no direct evidence of prohibited contact was admitted; the trial court found violation and sentenced four years, which the court of appeals affirmed
- The trial court found that Hacker lived at his wife’s residence and repeatedly contacted her, interpreting his custody-care arrangements as prohibited contact; the protective order and temporary conditions were argued to affect behavior; the State’s motive theory relied on collateral issues and inconsistent testimony; the appellate courts later reversed, ordering dismissal of the revocation motion
- The probation officer testified about the address change and custody arrangements; Hacker admitted to care of children at the wife’s home and frequent telephone discussions about custody; the wife testified she did not want the no-contact condition; the trial judge credited the probation officer’s credibility and found living at the wife’s residence evidence of prohibited contact; no independent proof of prohibited contact was admitted
- The court held that the evidence did not prove prohibited contact under the no-contact condition; proximity or living at the home, by itself, did not constitute prohibited contact; extrajudicial statements cannot alone establish the violation without independent corroboration; the court emphasized that motive or opportunity cannot substitute for proof of the prohibited conduct
- The result: the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation; the appellate court reversed and dismissed the State’s motion to revoke probation
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Hacker admit to prohibited contact under the no-contact condition? | State argued Hacker admitted to phone contacts violating the condition | Hacker argued communications were for child custody and did not violate the exception | No; communications fell within custody exception and did not prove violation |
| Can Hacker’s proximity to or presence at his wife’s residence establish prohibited contact? | State urged that living at wife’s home and keeping belongings there showed prohibited contact | Appellant contends mere presence, without contact, is not prohibited | No; proximity alone or residing there is not per se prohibited contact |
| May prohibited contact be inferred from the evidence if no direct admission exists? | State contends inferences from frequent phone calls and custody arrangements support violation | Inferential evidence requires more than conjecture; no independent proof of violation | No; the evidence did not allow a rational inference of prohibited contact beyond mere suspicion |
| Was the State’s entire evidentiary theory sufficient under the standard for probation revocation? | State relied on motive, opportunity, and circumstantial indicators to show violation | Combined evidence failed to prove actual prohibited contact; insufficient to revoke probation | No; the combined evidence was not legally sufficient to prove violation; reversal and dismissal of revocation |
Key Cases Cited
- Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (probation violation standards; evidence required for inference of violation under relaxed burden of proof)
- Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (U.S. 1992) (perjury and false statements as evidence when other conduct established guilt)
- Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (integrative approach to evaluating evidence and sufficiency for probation revocation)
- Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (motive and opportunity evidence; not sufficient alone to prove violation)
- Bible v. State, 162 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (standard of review and evidentiary sufficiency in criminal contexts)