Habibi v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1082

Habibi, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted in California on Nov. 3, 1999, of Battery of a Current or Former Significant Other (PC §243(e)(1)) with a 365-day suspended sentence that extended into a leap year.
DHS charged Habibi as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for having committed a crime of domestic violence.
IJ denied cancellation of removal, holding Habibi’s conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under §1101(a)(43)(F).
BIA affirmed, applying a 365-day definition of one year for purposes of “term of imprisonment” under §1101(a)(43)(F).
Habibi argued leap-year service made his 365-day sentence not meet the “at least one year” threshold; the panel relied on Matsuk to uphold 365 days as a year.
Court held the BIA’s interpretation is rational and should be followed, and Lagandaon’s 365-day definition does not control §1101(a)(43)(F).
Habibi also argued the misdemeanor classification of his offense forecloses eligibility; court rejected reliance on state labeling and noted no due process/equal protection violation from circuit split.
Court rejected Habibi’s equal protection challenge to §212(h) waiver exclusions for LPRs, citing Taniguchi v. Schultz.
Result: petition for review denied; Habibi remains ineligible for cancellation of removal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether leap year affects the ‘term of imprisonment’ under §1101(a)(43)(F).	Habibi argues 365 days is not a year when served across a leap year.	BIA/Matsuk define one year as 365 days regardless of leap years.	Yes; 365 days constitutes a year under §1101(a)(43)(F).
Whether Habibi’s leap-year service invalidates his aggravated felony classification.	As a leap-year completion could render the sentence < 366 days, the offense may not be an aggravated felony.	Leap-year nuances would cause absurd results; BIA’s 365-day rule is rational.	No; leap-year service does not defeat the 365-day threshold.
Whether the underlying misdemeanor label affects the aggravated felony analysis.	Labeling as a misdemeanor might preclude federal classification as an aggravated felony.	State labeling is irrelevant to federal definition; crime meets the aggravated felony definition.	Misdeclaration of misdemeanor does not defeat the federal aggravation analysis.
Whether excluding LPRs from §212(h) waivers violates equal protection.	LPRs should have equal opportunity to seek waivers like non-LPRs.	Legislative choice rationally differentiates LPRs; Taniguchi controls.	No equal protection violation; rational basis supports exclusion.

Matsuk v. INS, 247 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2001) (upheld 365 days as ‘one year’ for aggravated felony purposes)
Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (year defined as 365 days except leap years for continuous presence analysis)
Taniguchi v. Schultz, 303 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (LPRs excluded from §212(h) waivers; rational basis)
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished BIA orders not Chevron; Skidmore deferential analysis)
Gonzalez-Tamariz v. United States, 310 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2002) (context for statutory interpretation of §1101(a)(43))
Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2001) (cited in equal-protection context on circuit splits)
Corona-Sanchez v. United States, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc: relevance to aggravated felony analysis)