Haas v. Hudson & Wylie LLP, 940 N.W.2d 650

Adjacent Rolette County parcels originally owned by W.A. Lawston were partitioned; the Haas parcel (north) and the Hudson parcel (south) later changed hands to the Haases and Hudson & Wiley LLP respectively.
A meandering road runs along the Hudson parcel; two portions (2.19 and 3.5 acres) north of the road lie adjacent to the Haas property.
The Haases used those northern portions for grazing and hay since the early 1960s and sued in April 2018 alleging adverse possession, acquiescence, trespass, and willful damage.
At a bench trial, Terry Hudson and Luann Wiley testified their deceased father, Raymond Hudson, told them he owned the northern parcels and had given the Haases permission to use them; the Haases did not object at trial but raised a post-trial objection.
The district court treated the father’s statements as non-hearsay, concluded the Haases’ use was permissive (not hostile), and dismissed the complaint.
The Supreme Court held the district court erred in admitting and relying on the hearsay statements (which were central to the court’s permissive-use finding), reversed and remanded for further proceedings without considering that hearsay; it affirmed admitting testimony about a proposed land swap under the "opened the door" doctrine.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Haases preserved the hearsay objection for appeal	Post-trial brief objection sufficed	Waived by failing to object at trial	Preservation adequate; court exercised discretion to consider post-trial objection
Whether testimony that Raymond Hudson told others he owned the land was hearsay and admissible	Such statements are hearsay and inadmissible to prove permission/ownership	Statements were not hearsay because offered to show knowledge, not truth	Statements were hearsay when used to prove permission/ownership and inadmissible; district court abused discretion
Whether admission of the inadmissible hearsay requires reversal	Hearsay induced essential factual finding (permissive use) so reversal required	Other admissible evidence (e.g., Herman) supported permissive finding	Reversal required because inadmissible evidence affirmatively appeared to have induced essential finding; remand for reconsideration without that hearsay
Whether testimony about a proposed land swap was inadmissible under Rule 408	Land-swap statements are compromise negotiations and inadmissible	Haases opened the door by testifying about the swap on direct exam	Admission was not an abuse of discretion because Haases opened the door; testimony admissible for that reason

Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1977) (bench-trial rule: incompetent evidence warrants reversal only if it induced an essential finding)
Matson v. Matson, 226 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1975) (discussion of reversal standards for admission/exclusion of evidence in nonjury trials)
Krueger v. Krueger, 840 N.W.2d 613 (N.D. 2013) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
State v. Brewer, 893 N.W.2d 184 (N.D. 2017) (preservation requirement for objections under N.D.R.Ev. 103)
Schlossman & Gunkelman, Inc. v. Tallman, 593 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 1999) (Rule 408 exclusion of compromise evidence and permissible exceptions)
Schwab v. Zajac, 823 N.W.2d 737 (N.D. 2012) ("opening the door" doctrine allowing otherwise inadmissible evidence to qualify or explain prior testimony)
Thomas v. Strickland, 500 N.W.2d 598 (N.D. 1993) (explaining Rule 408 exclusion norm and exceptions)