Haag v. Castro
959 N.E.2d 819
| Ind. | 2012Background
- Players on Carmel Commotion, an IYSA-affiliated team, rode in a rented van during a Colorado tournament-related trip; IYSA's coach organized trip and Carmel Commotion sought coverage under IYSA's Virginia Surety business auto policy; district court granted summary judgment for Virginia Surety; Court of Appeals affirmed; Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to decide whether the van was used in the IYSA's business.
- IYSA's Articles of Incorporation set forth purposes including promoting, regulating, and conducting youth soccer activities in Indiana; Playing Rules further outline governance of youth soccer.
- Trial evidence showed Carmel Commotion traveled to Colorado for a team-building/tournament context with IYSA approval; accident occurred en route to a team-building activity, not a game field.
- Policy endorsement provides hired auto coverage limited to use “in the business of” the Named Insured, and excludes coverage for transportation of youth to/from athletic events; interpretation hinges on whether the team van was used in the IYSA’s business.
- Court below held no coverage because the van was not used in the IYSA’s business; Supreme Court granted transfer to interpret the endorsement language.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the rented van was being used in the business of the IYSA. | Haag argues the trip was in the IYSA’s business because it advanced promotion/competition. | Castro/IYSA argue the trip was for a team-building event, not the IYSA’s business. | No coverage; not used in the IYSA’s business. |
| Whether the endorsement's second sentence excludes coverage for team-building transport. | If covered by the first sentence, the second sentence should not defeat coverage absent clear language. | Second sentence excludes transportation to/from athletic events; team-building trip may fall under excluded transport. | Second sentence does not clearly exclude; coverage not illusory. |
| Whether the term 'in the business of' is ambiguous and how it should be construed. | Ambiguity should be resolved in favor of coverage given insured-drafter disparity. | Term unambiguous; governs whether vehicle use falls within coverage. | Term unambiguous; construction in favor of insurer does not apply; generally, not in the IYSA’s business. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lexington Ins. Co. v. Am. Healthcare Providers, 621 N.E.2d 332 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (ambiguity standards and illusory coverage principles cited in Indiana)
- Bosecker v. Westfield Ins. Co., 724 N.E.2d 241 (Ind.2000) (ambiguous policy language construed against insurer to further indemnity)
- Kiger v. Am. States Ins. Co., 662 N.E.2d 945 (Ind.1996) (special rule: ambiguities construed in insured's favor)
- Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467 (Ind.1985) (insurance policy interpretation governs by plain/ordinary meaning if unambiguous)
- Masonic Accident Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 200 Ind. 472, 164 N.E.628 (1929) (early rule favoring insured on ambiguous policy terms)