Ha Nguyen v. Ben Curry
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 24117
| 9th Cir. | 2013Background
- In 2003 Nguyen was convicted in California for cocaine possession (Count One), possession of a forged driver’s license (Count Two), and misdemeanor false ID (Count Three); the trial court imposed a three-strikes 25-to-life sentence on Count Two initially, later reduced on appeal to a misdemeanor and remanded for resentencing.
- On resentencing, the trial court reinstated prior convictions and imposed a 25-to-life sentence under Count One; Nguyen argued this increased punishment violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and later raised Eighth and Double Jeopardy claims in federal habeas proceedings.
- Nguyen filed a timely federal §2254 petition alleging (1) an exhausted Eighth Amendment claim and (2) an unexhausted Fifth Amendment double jeopardy claim; the magistrate stayed to allow exhaustion and Nguyen later filed a state habeas petition which the California Supreme Court summarily denied as untimely.
- After the AEDPA limitations period expired, Nguyen amended his federal petition to add (3) a new appellate-counsel ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claim (failure to raise the double jeopardy claim on appeal).
- The district court denied the petition, finding the double jeopardy and appellate-counsel IAC claims procedurally defaulted and applying Coleman cause-and-prejudice; Nguyen appealed, and the Ninth Circuit considered Martinez and Trevino in addressing whether Martinez’s equitable “cause” rule extends to appellate-counsel IAC and whether the late-added claim related back under Mayle.
- The Ninth Circuit held that Martinez/Trevino’s standard for excuse of procedural default applies to appellate-counsel IAC and that Nguyen’s appellate-counsel IAC claim relates back to his timely petition; the case was reversed and remanded for the district court to apply Martinez in the first instance.
Issues
| Issue | Nguyen's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martinez/Trevino equitable "cause" rule (excusing procedural default caused by ineffective postconviction counsel) applies to appellate-counsel IAC as well as trial-counsel IAC | Martinez’s rule covers any Sixth Amendment IAC claim where ineffective counsel at the initial-review collateral proceeding prevented presentation; appellate-counsel IAC fits that description | Martinez applies only to trial-counsel IAC (or situations where trial IAC cannot be raised on direct appeal) and should not extend to appellate-counsel IAC | Held: Martinez/Trevino applies to appellate-counsel IAC when the underlying IAC claim was procedurally defaulted by ineffective counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding; remanded for district court to apply Martinez in first instance |
| Whether Nguyen’s appellate-counsel IAC claim (added after AEDPA limitations expired) is time-barred or relates back to the timely-filed original petition | The IAC claim relates back under Mayle because it shares a common core of operative facts with the timely claims (same resentencing facts: having served original time then resentenced to 25-to-life) | The IAC claim arose later in time and is a different type of claim, so it cannot relate back and is untimely | Held: The IAC claim relates back under Rule 15(c)/Mayle because all claims rest on the same common core of operative facts; thus the claim is not time-barred |
| Whether district court should have excused procedural default under Coleman absent Martinez analysis | Martinez (and Trevino) provide an equitable avenue to excuse default caused by ineffective initial-review counsel; Nguyen urges remand to apply that standard | The district court’s Coleman-only analysis was sufficient and Martinez does not help Nguyen | Held: Because the district court decided the case before Martinez, the Ninth Circuit remanded so the district court can apply Martinez’s standard to Nguyen’s procedural default |
| Whether, if Martinez excuse is found and appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective, the underlying double jeopardy claim can proceed | If Martinez cause is established and appellate counsel was ineffective, the double jeopardy procedural default may be excused and the claim can be heard on the merits | State opposes and asserted procedural and timing defenses | Held: If district court finds Martinez cause and constitutionally ineffective appellate counsel, then Coleman supports excusing the procedural default of the double jeopardy claim; district court to determine these factual/legal matters on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (equitable rule permitting excuse of procedural default where ineffective initial-review counsel failed to raise IAC)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) (extended Martinez to situations where practical obstacles make it unlikely IAC could be raised on direct appeal)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (ordinary cause-and-prejudice rule for excusing procedural default)
- Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005) (amended habeas claims relate back if tied to a common core of operative facts)
- Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel)