2023 CO 48
Colo.2023Background
- A-J.A.B. was born testing positive for methamphetamine; Adams County Human Services filed a dependency-and-neglect petition and later moved to terminate the mother’s parental rights.
- Mother twice asserted possible Cherokee and Lakota (Sioux) ancestry via a maternal great-grandmother but acknowledged she and the child were not enrolled and she likely would not qualify for tribal membership.
- The juvenile court ordered mother to complete ICWA paperwork but did not initially direct the Department to perform due diligence under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-126(3); mother never completed the forms.
- On appeal the court of appeals (A-J.A.B. I) held the juvenile court erred by not directing the Department to exercise due diligence and articulated a three-part due-diligence test; the case was remanded for limited further inquiry.
- On remand the Department attempted to contact mother and successfully reached the maternal grandmother, who signed a declaration denying Native heritage; the juvenile court found the Department satisfied due diligence and that ICWA did not apply, and the court of appeals affirmed.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to define the statutory meaning of “due diligence” in § 19-1-126(3), adopt a flexible but earnest-investigation standard, and affirm the court of appeals’ ultimate conclusion that the Department satisfied due diligence here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mother) | Defendant's Argument (People/Department) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What constitutes “due diligence” under § 19-1-126(3)? | Due diligence requires contacting the relevant tribes in every case where a child may be Indian so tribes can determine membership/eligibility. | Due diligence requires earnest efforts tailored to the facts; it need not always include contacting tribes or follow a rigid checklist. | Court adopts a flexible standard: earnestly investigate the basis for the heritage claim, contact specifically identified persons with knowledge, and seek any additional information that could show a reason to know. |
| Do generalized assertions of Indian heritage trigger ICWA notice? | Mother: Her statements of Cherokee and Lakota ancestry were sufficient to require tribal notice. | Department: Vague or generalized heritage claims without more do not meet the "reason to know" threshold and do not automatically trigger formal ICWA notice. | Court: Mere assertions of heritage, even naming tribes, do not by themselves create a "reason to know"; they instead trigger the § 19-1-126(3) due-diligence inquiry. |
| Did the Department satisfy § 19-1-126(3) in this case? | Mother: Department failed to contact the great-aunt specifically identified as the best source and failed to contact tribes. | Department: It attempted to contact mother repeatedly and obtained a signed declaration from maternal grandmother denying Native heritage; no other leads existed. | Court: Under the flexible standard, the Department’s post-remand efforts sufficed; juvenile court’s credibility findings were permissible, and ICWA did not apply. |
Key Cases Cited
- Haaland v. Brackeen, 143 S. Ct. 1609 (2023) (discussing ICWA’s substantive and procedural guardrails)
- Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) (context on ICWA’s purpose to prevent wholesale removal of Indian children)
- Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (ICWA and tribal interests in child-custody matters)
- Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) (principle that statutes concerning Indian law are construed in favor of tribes)
- People in Interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 516 P.3d 924 (Colo. 2022) (holding that mere assertions of heritage without more do not create reason to know and trigger § 19-1-126(3))
- People in Interest of My. K.M. v. V.K.L., 512 P.3d 132 (Colo. 2022) (background on ICWA’s legislative purpose and Colorado’s implementation)
- People in Interest of K.C. v. K.C., 487 P.3d 263 (Colo. 2021) (on a court’s inquiry duties under Colorado’s ICWA statute)
- People in Interest of A-J.A.B., 511 P.3d 750 (Colo. App. 2022) (division’s three-part due-diligence test and limited remand)
- People in Interest of Jay.J.L., 514 P.3d 312 (Colo. App. 2022) (alternative approach stressing flexible, non-formulaic due diligence)
