H. Fredrick Peterson v. Mark H. Reiter & Chris A. Reiter
37802-1
| Wash. Ct. App. | Dec 14, 2021Background
- In 1986 Peterson conveyed a 7.69-acre parcel (15 Hardy Road) to Eldon Graves while reserving "all future development rights for any 'above-grade improvements'" and imposing use restrictions; the deed allowed limited residential-type improvements (e.g., landscaping, three-car garage, repair or replacement of existing improvements).
- The deed used the term "Grantee" throughout and included a reservation paragraph stating the reservation "shall be the property of Grantor, retained by Grantor for the benefits of Grantor’s heirs and/or assigns" and that development rights could be transferred only by a "document of conveyance executed by Grantor, or Grantor’s successors or assigns."
- Graves later defaulted on a loan; the bank re-acquired the property and in 1999 Mark and Chris Reiter bought it; they later remodeled the house (including a three-car garage) and in 2017 the house burned down.
- The Reiters rebuilt using the same footprint and obtained a county building permit; Peterson objected, asserting the deed permitted repair/replacement only for the original grantee (Graves) and that "Grantee" did not include successors without a conveyance from Peterson.
- Peterson sued for declaratory relief; the trial court denied Peterson’s summary judgment and granted the Reiters’ summary judgment; Peterson appealed arguing (among other things) that "Grantee" meant only Graves, the covenant was personal, and portions of Peterson’s declaration recounting pre-sale conversations with Graves should have been struck.
Issues
| Issue | Peterson's Argument | Reiters' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the term "Grantee" in the deed includes successors/assigns | "Grantee" means only the original grantee (Graves); ordinary meaning is one to whom a grant is made | "Grantee" reasonably includes successors; deed must be read as a whole and purposes require successors be bound/benefit | The court held "Grantee" includes the original grantee’s successors; deed construed as whole to effect parties' intent |
| Whether the use restriction is a personal covenant (not running with the land) | The covenant is personal because it does not expressly say "heirs and assigns" after "Grantee" | The covenant runs with the land; deed context and other provisions show intent to bind successors | The court rejected the personal-covenant argument and found deed language and context demonstrate intent for obligations/rights to apply to successors |
| Whether Reiters needed an "appropriate document of conveyance" from Peterson to rebuild after fire | Reservation requires conveyance from Grantor or successors before any subdivision/improvement beyond listed uses, so Reiters needed conveyance | Rebuilding was a repair/replacement allowed by the use restrictions and thus did not require a separate conveyance | The court held rebuilding was permitted by the use-restrictions (repair/replace) and no conveyance was required for that activity |
| Admissibility/effect of Peterson's declaration re: pre-sale discussions with Graves (dead man’s/evidence issue) | Peterson offered his declaration recounting negotiations to show intent that rights were limited to Graves | Reiters sought to strike those portions under the dead man’s statute and argued they contradict the deed | The court said extrinsic statements that contradict the deed cannot create a factual issue; it discounted inconsistent portions and affirmed without relying on those statements (no need to resolve motion to strike) |
Key Cases Cited
- Strauss v. Premera Blue Cross, 194 Wn.2d 296 (2019) (summary judgment reviewed de novo and standards for CR 56)
- Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban Lines Ass’n, 156 Wn.2d 253 (2006) (deed interpretation aims to enforce original parties' intent)
- Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873 (2003) (intention of original parties determined from deed as a whole)
- Newport Yacht Basin Ass’n of Condominium Owners v. Supreme Northwest, Inc., 168 Wn. App. 56 (2012) (the written instrument is the best evidence of parties' intent for deeds)
- Tacoma Mill Co. v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 89 Wash. 187 (1916) (principle that recourse to extrinsic evidence is unnecessary when intent is clear from instrument)
- Pelly v. Panasyuk, 2 Wn. App. 2d 848 (2018) (deed construction follows contract rules)
- Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493 (2005) (objective manifestation theory; words given ordinary meaning unless entire agreement shows contrary intent)
- Quinault Indian Nation v. Imperium Terminal Servs., LLC, 187 Wn.2d 460 (2017) (courts may consult dictionary definitions for undefined terms)
- Hollis v. Garwall, Inc., 137 Wn.2d 683 (1999) (extrinsic evidence illuminates but cannot contradict or rewrite written instrument)
- Ellensburg Lodge No. 20, I.O.O.F. v. Collins, 68 Wash. 94 (1912) (distinguishes personal covenants from those binding successors; successor deeds incorporating agreement can bind assigns)
- Feider v. Feider, 40 Wn. App. 589 (1985) (right of first refusal is personal and does not necessarily run with land)