H.C. Equities, LP v. County of Union (084556) (Middlesex County & Statewide), A-1/2-20

Background

H.C. Equities leased two commercial buildings to Union County; County ceased rent payments in 2012 and parties entered settlement negotiations.
The Union County Improvement Authority retained Colliers, which produced a January 20, 2017 report critical of the leased buildings; H.C. Equities obtained the report in early 2017.
H.C. Equities’ counsel wrote three letters (Feb. 22, Mar. 8, Mar. 9, 2017) objecting to the Colliers report, demanding withdrawal/preservation of documents, and warning of possible tort litigation, but did not identify or quantify specific tort claims in the format required by the Tort Claims Act.
H.C. Equities served a formal Notice of Tort Claim on the County (and copied the Authority) on June 13, 2017 and sued both entities on April 23, 2018 asserting trade libel, defamation, conspiracy, and related torts and contract claims.
The trial court held accrual no later than March 8, 2017, found the June 13 notice untimely, denied late‑filing relief, and dismissed the tort claims; the Appellate Division reversed, finding the three letters collectively constituted substantial compliance.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division: accrual was no later than March 8, 2017; the letters—separately or together—did not meet N.J.S.A. 59:8-4, substantial compliance was not shown, and the tort claims were barred.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the three pre-suit letters satisfied the Tort Claims Act notice requirement via substantial compliance	Letters, read together, put defendants on notice of tort claims and met the Act's purposes	Letters were informal correspondence that did not identify, describe, or quantify tort claims; cannot aggregate separate communications to make a single notice	No. Letters, individually or collectively, did not provide the statutorily required claim information; substantial compliance not shown
When the tort claims accrued for purposes of the 90‑day filing rule	Accrual at earliest Jan. 20, 2017 or later if a continuing tort; discovery rule may toll accrual	Accrual no later than Mar. 8, 2017 when H.C. Equities expressly objected and identified parties as liable	Accrued no later than Mar. 8, 2017 (discovery rule applied); 90‑day deadline ran from that date
Timeliness of formal notice (served June 13, 2017) and motions to file late notice under N.J.S.A. 59:8‑9	June 13 notice and later motions were within equitable consideration or justified by extraordinary circumstances	June 13 notice missed the 90‑day deadline (due June 6); motions for leave to file late notice were filed after the one‑year window and lacked extraordinary circumstances	June 13 notice was untimely; motions for leave to file late notice were also untimely or unsupported—claims barred absent valid substantial compliance
Whether Appellate Division erred by aggregating multiple communications as a single notice	Multiple communications may be read together to satisfy notice where they supply required information	Aggregation imposes unreasonable burden on public entities and conflicts with statutory intent of a single identifiable claim document	Aggregation is improper here; the Act contemplates a single identifiable notice—Appellate Division erred

Key Cases Cited

Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 341 (2001) (factors for assessing substantial compliance with statutory notice requirements)
Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111 (2000) (accrual and application of discovery rule for tort claims)
D.D. v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 213 N.J. 130 (2013) (limits on applying substantial compliance under Tort Claims Act)
County of Hudson v. Dep’t of Corr., 208 N.J. 1 (2011) (substantial compliance doctrine and preventing barring legitimate claims for mere technical defects)
Rogers v. Cape May Cnty. Off. of Pub. Def., 208 N.J. 414 (2011) (court lacks authority to relieve failure to file or move for late notice after one‑year statutory period)
McDade v. Siazon, 208 N.J. 463 (2011) (standard of review for summary judgment and legal conclusions)