Gwinnett County School District v. Cox
289 Ga. 265
Ga.2011Background
- Gwinnett County School District and other local systems challenge the 2008 Charter Schools Commission Act as unconstitutional under Art. VIII, Sec. V, Par. VII(a) for creating state chartered “special schools.”
- The Act creates the Georgia Charter Schools Commission to authorize “commission charter schools” defined as special schools; the Commission may operate outside local boards’ control.
- Appellees include former State Superintendent Kathy Cox, the Commission, its members, the Georgia Department of Education, and the first three chartered schools under the Act.
- The Court held the Act’s creation of commission charter schools conflicts with Art. VIII, Sec. V, Par. VII(a) because those schools are not “special schools” as historically understood.
- The majority bases its decision on constitutional text, history, and ordinary meaning of “special schools,” distinguishing them from general K-12 schools controlled by local boards; the dissent would uphold the Act as constitutional.
- The decision reverses the trial court’s ruling, concluding the Act plainly and palpably conflicts with the Constitution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Act violates Art. VIII, Sec. V, Par. VII(a) by creating state chartered special schools. | The Act creates commission charter schools outside local control, infringing the constitutionally reserved power of local boards. | The Act ambitiously broadens “special schools” to authorize state chartered options without duplicating local schools. | Yes; the Act conflicts with the Constitution and is unconstitutional. |
| Whether “special schools” in 1983 means only narrow categories or any school created outside local system. | “Special schools” should be interpreted narrowly to include only historically listed types. | “Special schools” should be read broadly to include any school created by the General Assembly outside local systems. | Broad interpretation; general K-12 schools are not “special.” |
| Whether the majority’s interpretation logically supports preserving local control while striking the Act. | The Act, even if unconstitutional in some applications, could be saved by narrowing; the majority’s approach would upend long-standing education framework. | Judicial rewriting to salvage the Act would exceed the Court’s authority. | The Act cannot be saved; it conflicts with the Constitution. |
| Whether precedents on “adequate public education” are affected by this ruling. | Local boards bear exclusive duty to provide adequate education; the Act would disrupt this balance. | State and local authorities share education responsibilities; the Act is a permissible tool under constitutional text. | Not reached; Court reverses on the constitutionality issue. |
Key Cases Cited
- McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632 (Ga. 1981) (exclusive control over general K-12 not absolute; constitutional history cited)
- Dev. Auth. of DeKalb County v. State of Ga., 286 Ga. 36 (Ga. 2009) (presumption of constitutionality; burden on challengers)
- Collins v. Mills, 198 Ga. 18 (Ga. 1944) (interpretation of constitution text with historical context)
- Fortson v. Weeks, 232 Ga. 472 (Ga. 1974) (judicial authority to exclude unconstitutional application; limits of rewriting statutes)
- Buice v. Dixon, 223 Ga. 645 (Ga. 1967) (unconstitutionality must be clear and palpable; harmony with constitution required)
- Blevins v. Dade County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 113 (Ga. 2010) (facial challenge requires showing statute unconstitutional in all applications)
- Williamson v. Schmid, 237 Ga. 630 (Ga. 1976) (interpretation of words by ordinary meaning when applying constitutional language)
- Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163 (Ga. 1945) (ordinary meaning of words in constitutional interpretation)