GWENDOLYN LITTMAN v. ANDREW CACHO.
143 A.3d 90
| D.C. | 2016Background
- A.L., born 2002, lived with his mother and grandmother Gwendolyn Littman; mother died 2003. Littman obtained custody in 2003, later lost and regained custody in 2005, and after extended litigation the court in July 2013 awarded father Andrew Cacho primary physical and sole legal custody while granting Littman "reasonable rights of visitation."
- Littman filed multiple contempt motions in 2014 alleging Cacho refused visitation under the July 2013 Custody Order.
- At a scheduled hearing the trial court raised concerns that the custody/visitation order might not comply with D.C. third‑party custody statute (Chapter 8A), and stated it would consider terminating Littman’s court‑ordered visitation.
- The trial court relied on this court’s decision in Ruffin v. Roberts to conclude it lacked authority to order third‑party visitation over a parent’s objection, orally denied contempt (finding the prior order not lawfully imposed), and issued a written Modification Order terminating Littman’s court‑ordered visitation.
- Littman appealed, arguing the trial court misapplied Ruffin and that Chapter 8A authorizes third‑party custody/visitation orders over parental objection; the Court of Appeals reviewed the legal question de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred in terminating Littman’s court‑ordered visitation by relying on Ruffin | Littman: Ruffin does not bar third‑party custody/visitation in cases governed by Chapter 8A; the court had authority to order visitation over Cacho’s objection | Trial court/Cacho: Ruffin precludes courts from ordering third‑party visitation over a parent’s objection | Court: Reversed — Ruffin is limited to Chapter 9 (divorce ancillary custody); Chapter 8A authorizes third‑party custody/visitation, so termination was legal error; Modification Order vacated and July 2013 Custody Order reinstated |
| Standard of review for terminating visitation based on legal authority | Littman: Legal question warrants de novo review | Implicit: decision was discretionary | Court: De novo review of legal determination; abuse of discretion if discretion rests on incorrect legal principles |
| Whether Ruffin broadly prohibits third‑party custody/visitation orders outside divorce ancillary proceedings | Littman: Ruffin was limited and inapplicable here | Trial court: Interpreted Ruffin as broadly barring third‑party visitation orders | Court: Ruffin applies to Chapter 9 divorce‑ancillary context only and is inapplicable to Chapter 8A proceedings |
| Whether alternative constitutional claims (e.g., Ex Post Facto, due process) require decision | Littman raised alternative arguments | Trial court did not rule on these | Court: Did not reach constitutional/ex post facto or notice issues because it resolved case on statutory/precedential error |
Key Cases Cited
- Ruffin v. Roberts, 89 A.3d 502 (D.C. 2014) (addressed trial court authority to award third‑party custody in divorce‑ancillary proceedings under Chapter 9)
- Jordan v. Jordan, 14 A.3d 1136 (D.C. 2011) (standard: custody orders reversed only for manifest abuse of discretion; discretion must be grounded in correct legal principles)
- In re N.N.N., 985 A.2d 1113 (D.C. 2009) (due process notice standards for family court proceedings)
- Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354 (D.C. 1979) (trial court abuses discretion when based on incorrect legal standards)