Guy Jones v. Bradshaw Bar Group, Inc.
15-17512
| 9th Cir. | Sep 18, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Guy Jones sued Bradshaw Bar Group, Inc. and individual defendants under the ADA and various California civil-rights and accessibility statutes.
- The parties executed a consent decree resolving the merits and all claims except attorneys’ fees; the district court entered the consent decree on March 10, 2015.
- Jones filed a motion for attorneys’ fees on September 23, 2015, which the district court denied as untimely under E.D. Cal. Local Rule 293(a) (28-day deadline after entry of final judgment).
- Jones argued the consent decree was not a final judgment on fees (and that parties’ post-decree negotiations or the decree’s terms extended the deadline) and that applying the local rule undermined ADA/California statutory policy.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the consent decree was a final judgment triggering the local-rule deadline, whether local rules may impose such deadlines for fee motions under the ADA/California law, and whether the parties’ conduct or the decree’s language altered the deadline.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the consent decree was a final judgment triggering the local-rule 28-day deadline for fee motions | Decree did not resolve fees, so it was not a final judgment for fee-timing purposes | Consent decree resolves the merits and is a final judgment even if court retains jurisdiction over collateral matters | The consent decree was a final judgment and started the 28-day clock under Local Rule 293(a) |
| Whether Local Rule 293(a) may bar fee motions under the ADA and California statutes | Applying the local rule defeats statutory fee-shifting policies and is inconsistent with those statutes | Statutes allow fee awards but do not prohibit reasonable filing deadlines; courts may adopt local timeliness rules | Local Rule 293(a) may bar untimely fee requests under the ADA and the cited California statutes; the rule is permissible |
| Whether parties’ post-decree negotiations modified the deadline without court approval | Continued negotiation between parties showed mutual understanding that deadline was extended | Extensions of time must be approved by the district court under Local Rule 144(a); parties’ conduct alone cannot alter the deadline | Parties’ negotiations did not extend the deadline; unilateral or bilateral conduct cannot supplant the court’s rule requiring court-approved extensions |
| Whether the consent decree’s text extended the deadline or whether prejudice to defendants justified relief | Decree (or practical considerations) should be read to extend the time; defendants would not be prejudiced by late fee motion | The decree’s scope is confined to its four corners and does not extend the fee deadline; lack of prejudice is not a basis to ignore local rules | The decree did not extend the deadline; absence of defendant prejudice does not excuse noncompliance with the local rule |
Key Cases Cited
- Stone v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.) (consent decree is a final judgment despite retained jurisdiction)
- White v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (U.S. 1982) (fee motions are collateral to the judgment and courts may set timeliness standards)
- Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.) (fee motions do not alter the underlying judgment)
- United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (U.S. 1971) (scope of a consent decree is determined by its four corners)
- Guam Sasaki Corp. v. Diana’s Inc., 881 F.2d 713 (9th Cir.) (review of district-court rulings on local rules is for abuse of discretion)