Guy Dell Sudduth, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa
15-1816
| Iowa Ct. App. | Apr 5, 2017Background
- In 2005 Guy Sudduth entered Alford pleas to two counts of criminal transmission of HIV and three counts of third-degree sexual abuse.
- In 2014 Sudduth filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR) alleging his pleas lacked a factual basis and his trial counsel was ineffective and failed to investigate.
- The district court dismissed the PCR application as time-barred under Iowa Code § 822.3 (three-year limitations period).
- Sudduth invoked the "ground of law" exception, arguing the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Rhoades v. State created new law that could not have been raised earlier.
- The court of appeals concluded Rhoades changed the law regarding judicial notice of HIV transmission and therefore Sudduth’s PCR claim was not time-barred; it reversed and remanded for a PCR hearing.
- Chief Judge Danilson dissented, arguing Rhoades’ holding about the inappropriateness of judicial notice applied prospectively to later pleas and that Sudduth’s 2005 pleas remained governed by the then-accepted judicial notice practice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sudduth’s PCR application is time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations | Rhoades created new law about the factual basis for HIV-transmission pleas that could not have been raised earlier, so the "ground of law" exception applies | Rhoades did not change the law; prior ability to take judicial notice at plea time means Sudduth’s claim is untimely | Court: Rhoades effected a change in the law; Sudduth’s claim falls within the "ground of law" exception and is not time-barred |
| Whether Rhoades requires expert proof of likelihood of HIV transmission to establish a factual basis | Relying on Rhoades, the State must now prove exchange or intentional exposure to bodily fluids capable of transmitting HIV, often requiring expert evidence | State argued Rhoades merely clarified existing law and did not impose a new requirement | Court treated Rhoades as altering the factual-basis requirement so prior judicial-notice practice cannot fill gaps now |
| Remedy after finding claim not time-barred | Sudduth asks for trial on PCR application (hearing) | State sought dismissal on timeliness grounds; had not squarely raised retroactivity | Court reversed dismissal and remanded for PCR hearing; did not decide retroactivity issue sua sponte |
| Precedential effect of intermediate appellate decision Stevens in relation to Rhoades | Sudduth relied on Stevens (intermediate appellate) as persuasive showing Rhoades changed law | State noted Stevens is nonprecedential and the Supreme Court denied further review | Court found Stevens persuasive and consistent with its view that Rhoades changed the law |
Key Cases Cited
- Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 2014) (held judicial notice of HIV transmission facts was no longer appropriate; altered factual-basis analysis for HIV-transmission pleas)
- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (defines Alford plea as a guilty plea while maintaining protestations of innocence)
- Nguyen v. State, 829 N.W.2d 183 (Iowa 2013) (discusses retroactivity principles for changes in law)
- Nguyen v. State, 878 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 2016) (resolves retroactivity issues referenced in prior Nguyen decision)